Attributions of Responsibility for Obesity: Narrative Communication Reduces Reactive Counterarguing Among Liberals

Informed by theory and research on attributions and narrative persuasion, we compared the effectiveness of narrative and nonnarrative messages in changing attributions of responsibility for causes and solutions related to obesity in the United States. We randomly assigned 500 adults to view one of three messages (narrative, evidence, and a hybrid of the two) emphasizing environmental causes of obesity, or a no‐exposure control condition. The narrative condition increased the belief that societal actors (government, employers) are responsible for addressing obesity, but only among liberals. This pattern of results was partially explained by the success of the narrative condition in reducing reactive counterarguing, relative to the evidence condition, among liberals. We conclude with theoretical and practical implications.     

Social categorization and attitude change

Two experiments were carried out investigating the effect of categorization on attitude change. It was predicted that the division of a number of individuals into two subgroups (categorization), in such a way that initial attitudes correlate with subgroup membership, would lead to accentuation of attitudinal differences between subgroups. It was further predicted that an identical distribution of initial attitudes without superimposed categorization would lead to convergence of attitude positions. In experiment 1, the effect of a male-female classification on attitude change was studied. It was indeed found that subjects changed their attitudes in the direction opposite to the position of the outgroup (intergroup attitude differentiation), but only for groups who were initially more extreme than the comparison group. In the control condition (no categorization), conformity effects were observed. In experiment 2, an antagonistic intergroup setting was induced. In this situation, strong intergroup attitude differentiation effects were observed, which were not affected by the magnitude of the initial intergroup discrepancy. In the control condition, subjects did not show conformity to the overall group mean, but maintained their initial noncentral attitude position.     

Intergroup fairness and bias in children

In recent years in research on intergroup relationships, the assumption has increasingly been made that discrimination dominates decisions when individuals allocate resources between (members of) own and other group. Conversely, in empirical studies of interpersonal decision-making, including an extensive literature on the development of children's allocation rules within dyadic relationships, it has been repeatedly observed that in dyadic relationships choices though responsive to various changes in the environment, are more strongly governed by fairness rules. The present research extends the interpersonal fairness paradigm to the intergroup case, and examines the effects of some of those variables, namely, children's age, input and attitudes toward other, that have been observed to influence choice behaviour within interpersonal relationships. The findings indicate that as children are socialized, fairness rules also play an increasing dominant role in intergroup allocation decisions, and that both relative input and the language of the outgroup influence such decisions. At the same time, there is some preliminary evidence to indicate that the relative strength of self-interest may be somewhat stronger in intergroup than in interpersonal relationships. Finally, a number of the issues that must be confronted in comparing the two more important forms of human social choices, interpersonal and intergroup decision-making, are considered.     

Recognition of emotions in music by children and adults

32 children 5 to 6 yr. old, 32 9 to 11 yr. old, and 32 adults linked musical fragments to emotions in a similar manner, older subjects being more accurate. Some emotions were more difficult than others; anger and fear were often confused. Older subjects gave better justifications for their choices.     

Functional measurement approach to self-estimation in multiattribute evaluation

Multiattribute analysis depends on measurement of values and weights. Unless these measures reflect the decision maker's true values and weights, the multiattribute formula may put a less-preferred alternative in first place. To avoid such disordinality requires stringent measurement conditions: First, the values and weights must be on linear (equal interval) or ratio (known zero) scales. Second, these scales must satisfy a condition of common unit across disparate attribute dimensions. Most methods of range adjustment beg both of these measurement questions. Functional measurement theory can solve both problems and so can be useful in multiattribute analysis. Past work has established the operation of a general cognitive algebra as an empirical reality. The averaging model, in particular, makes possible the definition and estimation of weights and values as distinct psychological parameters. It can also solve the problem of common unit. Cognitive algebra thus provides a grounded theoretical foundation on which to develop self-estimation methodology, in which decision makers provide direct estimates of their values and weights. The logic is straightforward. Functional measurement can analyze global judgments to obtain validated psychological scales. These scales may then be used as validational criteria for the self-estimates. Procedures to eliminate biases in the self-estimates can thus be tested and refined in well-learned multiattribute tasks, such as judgments of meals, in which global judgments are trustworthy. Once developed, such self-estimation procedures may be used with some confidence for general multiattribute analysis. A number of studies from 20-odd years of work on the theory of information integration are summarized to show good, although not unmixed promise for self-estimation.