Summation: Further assessment of a configural theory

Rats received Pavlovian conditioning in which food was signalled by a visual stimulus, A+, an auditory stimulus, B+, and a compound composed of different visual and auditory stimuli, CD+. Test trials were then given with the compound AB. Experiments 1 and 2A revealed stronger responding during AB than during CD. In Experiment 2B, there was no evidence of a summation of responding during AB when A+ B+ training was conducted in the absence of CD+ trials. A further failure to observe abnormally strong responding during ABwas found in Experiment 3 for which the training trials with A+ B+ CD+ were accompanied by trials in which C and D were separately paired with food. The results are explained in terms of a configural theory of conditioning, which assumes that responding during a compound is determined by generalization from its components, as well as from other compounds to which it is similar.     

Serial pattern learning by event observation.

Serial pattern learning was investigated in a variation of the task introduced by Nissen and Bullemer (1987). We presented an asterisk at 1 of 4 spatial locations on each trial, and Ss either responded with a keypress or observed the event. The first 4 blocks contained 10 repetitions of a 10- or 16-element pattern, and the 5th block contained a random sequence. The difference in response time on the 5th random block and the previous patterned block served as an indirect measure of pattern learning. A direct measure was obtained in a final test block in which Ss predicted the next asterisk position. Equivalent learning occurred for responding and observing with indirect measures, but observation was superior with direct measures. These findings indicate that knowledge of serial order can develop through simple perceptual experience, and this is more available to deliberate recall than is knowledge acquired while responding.     

Cognitive Neuropsychology and Developmental Disorders: Uncomfortable Bedfellows

Cognitive neuropsychology provides a theoretical framework and methods that can be of value in the study of developmental disorders, but the "dissociation" logic at the centre of this approach is not well suited to the developmental context. This is illustrated with examples from specific language impairment. Within the developing language system there is ample evidence for interaction between levels of representation, with modularity emerging in the course of development. This means that one typically is seeking to explain a complex pattern of associated impairments, rather than highly selective deficits. For instance, a selective impairment in auditory processing can have repercussions through the language system and may lead to distinctive syntactic deficits that are seen in written as well as spoken language. Changes in the nature of representations and in the relationships between components of a developing system mean that cross-sectional data at a single point in development may be misleading indicators of the primary deficit. Furthermore, traditional cognitive neuropsychology places a disproportionate emphasis on representational (competence) deficits, with processing (performance) deficits being relatively neglected. Methods for distinguishing these two kinds of impairment are discussed, as well as other approaches for elucidating the underlying nature of developmental disorders.     

Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know Themselves?

The intuition that we have privileged and unrestricted access to ourselves – that we inevitably know who we are, how we feel, what we do, and what we think – is very compelling. Here, we review three types of evidence about the accuracy of self-perceptions of personality and conclude that the glass is neither full nor empty. First, studies comparing self-perceptions of personality to objective criteria suggest that self-perceptions are at least tethered to reality – people are not completely clueless about how they behave, but they are also far from perfect. Second, studies examining how well people’s self-perceptions agree with others’ perceptions of them suggest that people’s self-views are not completely out of synch with how they are seen by those who know them best, but they are also far from identical. Third, studies examining whether people know the impressions they make on others suggest that people do have some glimmer of insight into the fact that others see them differently than they see themselves but there is still a great deal people do not know about how others see them. The findings from all three approaches point to the conclusion that self-knowledge exists but leaves something to be desired. The status of people’s self-knowledge about their own personality has vast implications both for our conception of ourselves as rational agents and for the methods of psychological inquiry.     

ARGUMENT TO BLISS: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

The essay examines intellectual virtue in the Summa theologiae, taking it as an interpretative key to the epistemology of the Summa theologiae as a whole. Because Aquinas blurs the line between the acquired and the theological virtues, and between virtues and the gifts of the Spirit, it becomes impossible to maintain the distinction between the realms of nature and grace, or between natural reason and revealed truth: grace permeates the most ordinary activities of human reasoning. This reading of the Summa theologiae raises questions about many contemporary debates, particularly those concerning natural law.