Stress-induced Fos-like Immunoreactivity in the Pons and the Medulla Oblongata of Rats

Immunoreactivity of the immediate early gene c-fos was used to investigate changes in the activity of brainstem neurons in response to acute stressors like immobilization, formalin-induced pain, cold exposure, hemorrhage and insulin-induced hypoglycemia. Different stressors induced Fos-like immunoreactivity in different pontine and medullary neurons. A single, 3 hour immobilization was found to be a very strong stimulus that activated brainstem catecholaminergic (tyrosine hydroxylase-immunopositive) neurons and cells in the raphe and certain pontine tegmental nuclei, as well as in the reticular formation. Pain, induced by a subcutaneous injection of formalin was also effective on catecholamine-synthesizing neurons and on others cells in the nucleus of the solitary tract. Cold exposure activated cells mainly in the sensory spinal trigeminal and parabrachial nuclei and in the so-called "pontine thermoregulatory area". Moderate Fos-like immunoreactivity was induced by a hypotonic (25%) hemorrhage in medullary catecholaminergic neurons, the nucleus of the solitary tract and the Barrington nucleus. Among stressful stimuli used, insulin-induced hypoglycemia elicited the smallest Fos activation in the lower brainstem. The present observations indicate that different stressors may use different neuronal pathways in the central organization of the stress response.     

Spontaneous causal inferences

Three studies examine the hypothesis that people spontaneously (i.e., unintentionally and without awareness of doing so) infer causes (the Spontaneous Causal Inference, or SCI, hypothesis). Using a cued-recall paradigm, Study 1 examines whether SCIs occur and Study 2 allows for a comparison between implicitly inferred and explicitly mentioned causes. Study 3 examines whether SCIs can be fully explained in terms of spreading activation to general, abstract schemes. It is suggested that STIs (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984), and spontaneous predicting inferences (e.g., [McKoon and Ratcliff, 1986a] and [McKoon and Ratcliff, 1986b]), may be better understood in their relation to SCIs.     

Spontaneous trait inference and construal level theory: Psychological distance increases nonconscious trait thinking

Can psychological distance affect how much perceivers form spontaneous trait inferences (STI) from others’ behaviors? On the basis of construal level theory (CLT) which posits that distant (vs. near) entities are represented more in terms of their abstract, global, and decontextualized features, we predicted that perceived distance would increase the tendency for perceivers to draw spontaneous trait inferences from behavioral information about actors. In two experiments, participants learned about people who were perceived as being distant or proximal to the self, and STI formation was subsequently assessed. We found that perceivers were more likely to form STIs about distant vs. near actors from the same behavioral information. These findings generalized across two distance dimensions: space and time. In addition, we found that priming individuals to adopt a high-level (vs. low-level) construal mindset also resulted in increased STI (Experiment 3). In sum, psychological distance facilitates STI formation, and this occurs via high-level construal of actors and their behaviors.     

When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences

Do people make trait inferences, even without intentions or instructions, at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information? Tulving's encoding specificity paradigm (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) was adapted for two recall experiments. Under memory instructions only, subjects read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, subjects recalled each sentence under one of three cuing conditions: (a) a dispositional cue (e.g., generous), (b) a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or (c) no cue. Recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Subjects were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, these results indicate that subjects unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. This suggests that attributions may be made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events.     

Spontaneous trait inferences are bound to actors' faces: evidence from a false recognition paradigm

A false recognition paradigm showed that spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) are bound to the person performing a trait-implying behavior. In 6 experiments, participants memorized faces and behavioral sentences. When faces were paired with implied traits in a recognition test, participants falsely recognized these traits more often than unrelated traits paired with the same faces or the same traits paired with familiar faces. The effect was obtained for a large set of behaviors (120). each presented for 5 s, and for behaviors that participants did not subsequently recognize or recall. Antonyms of the implied traits were falsely recognized less often than unrelated traits, suggesting that STIs have extended implications. Explicit person-trait judgments predicted both false recognition and response times for implied traits.     

Dyadic Influence in an “ESP Study” and TAT Measures of the Needs for Influence and Power

Ss “received ESP impressions” of the five standard ESP card symbols, for 100 trials. They were then randomly paired with same-sex Ss and asked to reach agreement on whatever disagreements existed on the first 50 trials. All Ss had previously taken a modified TAT, scored for the needs for Influence (n Influence) and Power (n Power). Ss with high n Influence prevailed significantly more often on the first disagreement, on disagreements during the first 25 trials, and over all 50 trials. N Power correlated only slightly with losses during the first 25 trials. Results were consistent with viewing n Influence as an interpersonal competence motive. N Power was apparently not engaged by the dyadic situation and its rewards.     

A reversal of the Stroop interference effect,through scanning:

Interference on the Stroop test has been explained on the basis of a stronger habit (word reading) interfering with a weaker one (color naming) on an incongruous color-word (CW) card. Since scanning for words is slower (weaker) than scanning for colors, it was predicted that making the Stroop a scanning task would produce more interference with scanning for words rather than colors on the CW card. This prediction was confirmed. In addition, analyses of individual differences offered some support for differential habit-strength theories of Stroop interference. However, differences between the standard and scanning Stroop tests suggested that some kind of information-processing analysis would be more fruitful.     

On the relation between spontaneous trait inferences and intentional inferences: An inference monitoring hypothesis

More than twenty five years after the beginning of research on spontaneous trait inferences (Winter & Uleman, 1984) an intriguing paradox in the impression formation literature remains: if traits are spontaneously inferred, why aren't they used to organize behavioral information and thereby facilitate recall under memory instructions (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980)? We hypothesized that organization by traits is more evident under impression formation goals because only in that case then are inferences sufficiently monitored to permit their use in organizing impressions. As a consequence, such monitored traits can then be used strategically as retrieval cues. Merging the main features of the Winter and Uleman and the Hamilton et al. experimental paradigms, Experiment 1 simultaneously replicated the main results of both studies. Using a new recognition paradigm, Experiments 2 and 3 further tested this inference monitoring hypothesis by showing that monitoring of trait inferences only occurs under particular processing goals, and is dependent on the availability of cognitive resources.     

Seeing others through rose-colored glasses: An affiliation goal and positivity bias in implicit trait impressions

People infer traits from other people's behaviors without intention, awareness, or effort, and this spontaneous trait inference (STI) effect has been shown to be robust. The purpose of the present research was to demonstrate the flexibility of STIs despite the ubiquity. Specifically, we examined the effect of an affiliation goal on STI formation and found a positivity bias. In Experiment 1, perceivers with an affiliation goal formed more positive (versus negative) spontaneous trait inferences compared to those without this goal and those who had been primed with semantically positive, affiliation-unrelated words. Experiment 2 provided evidence that this effect was driven by a motivational state by showing that the positivity bias occurs only when a perceiver's goal to affiliate remains unfulfilled. The goal's interaction with trait valence showed focused, goal-relevant bias. These studies are the first to show that STIs form flexibly in response to perceivers' primed social goals supporting the functionality account of STIs in implicit impression formation.     

The person reference process in spontaneous trait inferences

Five studies examined whether spontaneous trait inferences uniquely reference the person who performed a trait-implying behavior. On each study trial in 5 studies, participants saw 2 faces and a behavioral sentence referring to one of them. Later, participants saw face-trait pairs and indicated whether they had seen the trait word in the sentence presented with the face. Participants falsely recognized implied traits more when these traits were paired with actors' faces than with control faces. This effect was replicated for a large set effaces (120), after a week delay between study and recognition test, when equal attention was paid to each face, and when the orientation of the face at recognition was different from the orientation at encoding.