The effects of meritocracy beliefs on women's well-being after first-time gender discrimination

This study examined how meritocracy beliefs may buffer women from the negative psychological effects of an acute situation of gender discrimination. Although some research indirectly suggests that believing that meritocracy exists may increase wellbeing, group consciousness theories suggest that disbelieving that meritocracy exists will enhance psychological adjustment to gender discrimination. Women who reported little past experience with discrimination, and either believed or disbelieved that meritocracy exists, were exposed to either a laboratory situation of discrimination or a nondiscrimination failure (control) condition. Consistent with group consciousness theories, women experiencing discrimination reported greater well-being if they disbelieved that meritocracy exists than if they were believers. In contrast, women in the control condition reported greater wellbeing if they believed that meritocracy exists than if they were disbelievers. Implications for coping with discrimination are discussed.     

Forecasting “friends forever”: A longitudinal investigation of sustained closeness between best friends

Using data collected across 19 years, the chief goal of this study was to discover predictors of continued relational closeness between best friends. Participants were same‐sex and cross‐sex best friend pairs recruited from a small Midwestern college. In 1983, participants completed several tests and activities designed to assess facets of intimacy, with follow‐up studies in 1987 and 2002 measuring relational closeness. Regression analysis indicates that both manifest similarity and months of closeness in 1983 are associated with relational closeness in 2002. These results suggest that the investment of resources in the friendship and similarity between friends facilitate friendship longevity and that Kelley et al.’s (1983) conceptualization of closeness as related to interdependence is empirically robust.     

Construct representation and definitions in psychopathology: the case of delusion

Background  

Delusion is one of the most intriguing psychopathological phenomena and its conceptualization remains the subject of genuine debate. Claims that it is ill-defined, however, are typically grounded on essentialist expectations that a given definition should capture the core of every instance acknowledged as delusion in the clinical setting.