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Kelly Trogdon 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2013,94(4):465-485
Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse‐grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with Fine's Aristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary. 相似文献
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Kelly Trogdon 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):555-558
Two competing views in sparse ontology are monism and pluralism. In Trogdon 2009 I propose an account of intrinsicality that I argue is both compatible with monism and pluralism and independently plausible. Skiles 2009 argues that my account fails on both fronts. In this note I respond to his two objections. 相似文献
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Kelly Trogdon 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(2):147-165
A major stumbling block for non-reductive physicalism is Kim’s disjunctive property objection. In this paper I bring certain
issues in sparse ontology to bear on the objection, in particular the theses of priority monism and priority pluralism. Priority pluralism (or something close to it, anyway) is a common ontological background assumption, so in the first part
of the paper I consider whether the disjunctive property objection applies with equal force to non-reductive physicalism on
the assumption that priority monism is instead true. I ultimately conclude that non-reductive physicalism still faces a comparable
problem. In the second part, I argue, surprisingly enough, that what I call ‘fine-grained reductionism’, a particular version
of which Kim proposes as an alternative to non-reductive physicalism, may work better in the monist framework than the pluralist
one. I conclude that issues in sparse ontology, therefore, are more relevant to the debate about physicalism than one may
have thought.
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Kelly TrogdonEmail: |
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Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected
by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds
in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency
of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the
actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible.
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Kelly TrogdonEmail: |
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Philosophical Studies - Some see concrete foundationalism as providing the central task for sparse ontology, that of identifying which concreta ground other concreta but aren’t themselves... 相似文献
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