Metaethics and Mental Time Travel: a Reply to Gerrans and Kennett

Philosophia - In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency” (Mind 2010), Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that prominent versions of metaethical sentimentalism and moral realism...     

Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction

‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation between the items specified in the claim. In part one I explain this distinction and the problems neglecting it may cause. In part two I show that it has been neglected, and has caused those problems, at least with respect to one version of internalism. That is judgment internalism, which claims that moral beliefs are necessarily related to pro- or con-attitudes; e.g., that if you believe you ought to x you must have some motivation to x. The considerations standardly adduced in favor of judgment internalism support only a version which lacks the metaethical implications typically attributed to it, at least so far as anyone has shown. Proponents and opponents of judgment internalism fail to realize this because of their neglect of the modality/relation distinction. I illustrate by considering discussions of judgment internalism by Russ Shafer-Landau, Simon Blackburn, James Dreier, David Brink, and others.

This new science of ours: a more or less systematic history of consciousness and transcendence. Part I

This paper is a search for the origins and nature of human consciousness. This portion, the first part of two, takes up a signal work of Jung and one of Freud, both published in 1911 and both deriving thinking as the first embodiment of higher mental functions. Thinking and consciousness (and subsequently spirit) are elaborated in terms of the nature and vicissitudes of libido. Jung's less well understood theory regarding a quantitative libido is particularly addressed as are his non-Cartesian ways of reasoning. Also addressed is Jung's turning away in the final analysis from a frankly metaphysical and transcendent position as compared to the pre-Socratic philosophers with whom focused thinking began in the western world. Differentiation is made between mechanistic and energetic field dynamics in how reality is viewed.     

Response to Barbara Stephens's 'the Martin Buber-Carl Jung disputations: protecting the sacred in the battle for the boundaries of analytical psychology' (journal of analytical psychology, 2001, 46, 3, 455-91)

John Dourley, Response to Barbara Stephens's 'The Martin Buber–Carl Jung disputations: protecting the sacred in the battle for the boundaries of analytical psychology' ( Journal of Analytical Psychology , 2001, 46, 3, 455–91), p.479
Warren Colman, A response to Barbara Stephens , p.492
David Tresan, Response to Barbara Stephens's paper in JAP, 46, 3 , p.494
Barbara D. Stephens, Patterns at play: my response to respondents , p.498     

植物状态的残存脑功能和意识研究

综述了有关植物状态患者对外加刺激脑反应的功能成像研究文献,着重讨论了研究发现的非典型激活的临床价值以及植物状态患者是否存在意识的功能脑成像证据。     

小学生调节聚焦对生活满意度的影响:压力应对方式的中介作用

采用调节聚焦问卷、压力应对方式问卷和生活满意度问卷对北京市五所学校1174名小学生进行调查, 考察调节聚焦对小学生压力应对方式、生活满意度的影响, 并检验应对方式在调节聚焦和生活满意度之间的中介作用。结果发现:(1)促进定向对小学生生活满意度有显著正向预测作用, 预防定向对生活满意度有显著负向预测作用;(2)积极应对和促进定向更相关, 消极应对和预防定向更相关;(3)积极应对在促进定向和生活满意度之间起着完全中介的作用, 积极应对、消极应对均在预防定向和生活满意度之间起着部分中介的作用。