排序方式: 共有6条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett, 1995. London, Penguin. 587 pp., hbk £25, ISBN: 0–713–99090–2
Verificationism: Its History and Prospects, C. J. Misak, 1995. London and New York, Routledge. xviii + 254 pp. ISBN: 0–415–12597–9(hbk); 0–415–12598–7(pbk)
Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, Technology, John R. Josephson & Susan G. Josephson (Eds), 1994. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 306 pp.
Physics and Metaphysics. Theories of Space and Time, Jennifer Trusted, 1994. London, Routledge 210 pp. 相似文献
2.
Matthias Hild 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(1):109-135
Nelson Goodman cast the ‘problem of induction’ as the task of articulating the principles and standards by which to distinguish
valid from invalid inductive inferences. This paper explores some logical bounds on the ability of a rational reasoner to
accomplish this task. By a simple argument, either an inductive inference method cannot admit its own fallibility, or there
exists some non-inferable hypothesis whose non-inferability the method cannot infer (violating the principle of ‘negative
introspection’). The paper discusses some implications of this limited self-knowledge for the justifiability of inductive
inferences, auto-epistemic logic, and the epistemic foundations of game theory. 相似文献
3.
Matthias Hild 《Erkenntnis》1999,50(2-3):225-242
This paper works within a model of ungraded belief that characterizes epistemic states as logically closed and consistent sets of sentences. The aim of this paper is to discuss three diachronic coherence conditions for such beliefs. These coherence conditions are formulated in terms of the reasoner's present beliefs about how his present beliefs will evolve in the future, for instance, in response to different pieces of future evidence. 相似文献
4.
I re-examine Coherence Arguments (Dutch Book Arguments, No Arbitrage Arguments) for diachronic constraints on Bayesian reasoning.
I suggest to replace the usual game–theoretic coherence condition with a new decision–theoretic condition ('Diachronic Sure
Thing Principle'). The new condition meets a large part of the standard objections against the Coherence Argument and frees
it, in particular, from a commitment to additive utilities. It also facilitates the proof of the Converse Dutch Book Theorem.
I first apply the improved Coherence Argument to van Fraassen's (1984) Reflection principle. I then point out the failure
of a Coherence Argument that is intended to support Conditionalization as a naive, universal, update rule. I also point out
that Reflection is incompatible with the universal use of Conditionalization thus interpreted. The Coherence Argument therefore
defeats the naive view on Bayesian learning that it was originally designed to justify.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
5.
Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
6.
Herbert Bless Gerd Bohner Traudel Hild Norbert Schwarz 《European journal of social psychology》1992,22(3):309-312
In providing behavioural frequency reports, respondents use the range of the response alternatives as a frame of reference, resulting in higher estimates on scales that offer high rather than low values. The present study demonstrates that the size of this effect increases with increasing question difficulty. 相似文献
1