The relationship between recognition and cued recall in memory of enacted and nonenacted information

Summary An experiment was conducted to determine whether the processes underlying memory for enacted and nonenacted events are the same or different. The experimental paradigm used was that of recognition failure of recallable information. At study subjects were given verbal commands (e.g., break the match, roll the ball), that they were to remember or enact and remember. At test subjects were first asked to recognize the noun in each command in the absence of the verb and then to recall the noun with the verb present as cue. Half the subjects were given the two tests in the reverse order. The results demonstrate that enactment and nonenactment differ with respect to the degree of dependence/independence between recognition and recall. In the enactment condition recognition and cued recall are completely independent and in the nonenactment condition they are almost completely dependent.     

Development of a Facebook Addiction Scale

The Bergen Facebook Addiction Scale (BFAS), initially a pool of 18 items, three reflecting each of the six core elements of addiction (salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal, conflict, and relapse), was constructed and administered to 423 students together with several other standardized self-report scales (Addictive Tendencies Scale, Online Sociability Scale, Facebook Attitude Scale, NEO-FFI, BIS/BAS scales, and Sleep questions). That item within each of the six addiction elements with the highest corrected item-total correlation was retained in the final scale. The factor structure of the scale was good (RMSEA = .046, CFI = .99) and coefficient alpha was .83. The 3-week test-retest reliability coefficient was .82. The scores converged with scores for other scales of Facebook activity. Also, they were positively related to Neuroticism and Extraversion, and negatively related to Conscientiousness. High scores on the new scale were associated with delayed bedtimes and rising times.     

Meditators and non-meditators on sustained and executive attentional performance

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the mindfulness construct and the mental health benefits associated with mindfulness-based programmes, the relation between mindfulness and its proposed core component attention was studied. Buddhist and Western mindfulness meditators were compared with non-meditators on tasks of sustained (SART) and executive (the Stroop Task) attention. Relations between self-reported mindfulness (FFMQ) and sustained and executive attention were also analysed. No significant differences were found between meditators and non-meditators either in sustained or executive attention. High scores on the FFMQ total scale and on Describe were related to fewer SART errors. High scores on Describe were also related to low Stroop interference. Mindfulness meditators may have an increased awareness of internal processes and the ability to quickly attend to them but this type of refined attentional ability does not seem to be related to performance on attention tests requiring responses to external targets.     

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.     

Perceptions of traffic risk in an industrialised and a developing country

This study aimed to investigate differences in traffic risk perception among a Norwegian and Ghanaian public. This was carried out while controlling for relevant background variables such as gender, age, and levels of educational achievement. In order to obtain the core aim of the study, a self-completion questionnaire was devised and distributed to a representative sample of the Norwegian population (n = 247) and to a stratified sample in Accra and Cape-Coast in Ghana (n = 299). The results showed that the Ghanaian sample perceived higher traffic risk than the Norwegian sample. Gender, age, and levels of educational achievement exerted minimal influences on risk perception. The results were discussed in context of industrialisation, cultural differences, and health beliefs.     

Marriages and psychological distress among adult offspring of divorce: a Norwegian study

The study compares the likelihood of getting married and of getting divorced among the adult offspring of divorced parents versus the adult offspring of parents who remain married (total N = 37,230). It also compares levels of psychological distress in the two groups (total N= 22,898). Data derive from The Nord‐Trøndelag Health Study (HUNT) and population registries from Norway. Individuals with divorced parents tended to delay marriage or not marry at all. However, among those who married, there were more divorces among the offspring of divorced parents than among offspring of parents who were still married. Offspring of divorce tended to marry other offspring of divorce. These marriages were at especially high risk of dissolution. Parental divorce was particularly influential as a risk factor during the first years of marriage. Both parental divorce and the individuals’ own divorce were risk factors for psychological distress.     

Applied Ethics. A Defence

Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, cannot only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism.     

Distinctness of perceived three-dimensional form induced by modulated illumination: Effects of certain display and modulation conditions

The present study concerns the distinctness of the 3-D shape-induced on flat displays by spacemodulated illumination (“shape from shading”). The displays that we used varied in structure, hue contrast, lightness contrast, and in the number of reflectance edges present. The modulations of the illumination were a square-wave grating, a gradual modulation (a blurred grating), and an “O’Brien modulation,” which combines an edge and a gradient. The displays were compared, using the paired comparison method, as to the distinctness of the perceived 3-D form. The results showed that the structure and chromatic color of the display were important factors facilitating the distinctness of the induced 3-D shape under all the modulation conditions. The results are discussed in relation to the “vector model” for color constancy, proposed in earlier papers.     

Against liberty

Conclusion There are no private particular actions that should be altogether free of social interference. No absolute distinction can be made between types of actions affecting others and those affecting only the agent. Relative to a purpose in formulating an act of law, for instance, such a distinction can, however, be made. The idea of social freedom could therefore be thought to imply that even if there are no absolutely private particular actions, and even if society could interfere for any purpose to regulate the actions of the individual, not any reason for such interference is acceptable from the point of view of liberty. Acts of law should not be made unnecessarily inclusive with respect to their purpose and they should be designed to further public security. Not even in this weak formulation, however, can the principle of social liberty be defended against moral criticism. Some illiberal laws, in this sense, should after all be passed. Examples can be found in taxation law.The only reasonable conclusion to draw from all this is that there is no tenable principle of liberty.That there is no tenable principle of liberty does not mean that everything that has been condemned in the name of liberty should now be regarded as right. Many things said to result in a limitation of freedom could be wrong for other reasons. But probably not all of them are. So it will, I think, have some effects on our political views in general, if we accept the conclusion of this essay.