Variation of Preference Inconsistency When Applying Ratio and Interval Scale Pairwise Comparisons

Several studies on numerical rating in discrete choice problems address the tendency of inconsistencies in decision makers' measured preferences. This is partly due to true inconsistencies in preferences or the decision makers' uncertainty on what he or she really wants. This uncertainty may be reflected in the elicited preferences in different ways depending on the questions asked and methods used in deriving the preferences for alternatives. Some part of the inconsistency is due to only having a discrete set of possible judgments. This study examined the variation of preference inconsistency when applying different pairwise preference elicitation techniques in a five‐item discrete choice problem. The study data comprised preferences of five career alternatives elicited applying interval scale and numerically and verbally anchored ratio scale pairwise comparisons. Statistical regression technique was used to analyse the differences of inconsistencies between the tested methods. The resulting relative residual variances showed that the interval ratio scale comparison technique provided the greatest variation of inconsistencies between respondents, thus being the most sensitive to inconsistency in preferences. The numeric ratio scale comparison gave the most uniform preferences between the respondents. The verbal ratio scale comparison performed between the latter two when relative residual variances were considered. However, the verbal ratio scale comparison had weaker ability to differentiate the alternatives. The results indicated that the decision recommendation may not be sensitive to the selection between these preference elicitation methods in this kind of five‐item discrete choice problem. The numeric ratio scale comparison technique seemed to be the most suitable method to reveal the decision makers' true preferences. However, to confirm this result, more studying will be needed, with an attention paid to users' comprehension and learning in the course of the experiment. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

Causal and Constitutive Relations, and the Squaring of Coleman’s Diagram: Reply to Vromen

We respond to Jack Vromen’s (this issue) critique of our discussion of the missing micro-foundations of work on routines and capabilities in economics and management research. Contrary to Vromen, we argue that (1) inter-level relations can be causal, and that inter-level causal relations may also obtain between routines and actions and interactions; (2) there are no macro-level causal mechanisms; and (3) on certain readings of the notion of routines and capabilities, these may be macro causes.