How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

Abstract

Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (G&W) suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms.     

Migrations,transformations and tradition in the Finnish Pentecostal movement: why does all global not become local?*

In this article, I will outline the dynamics of social transformations and cultural preservation in the Finnish Pentecostal movement, which are caused and affected by different migrations in the history of the movement. With a history of hundred years, immersed by social and societal transformations, missionaries, new converts and new cultures, the Finnish Pentecostal movement has its own traditions, but nevertheless is constantly facing influences from different cultures. My aim in this article is to analyse the logics of transformation and preservation of Pentecostal religion and culture on a congregational level. I will compare two different migrations, the Karelian evacuation and the international immigration, as well as analyse the differences in acculturation between these groups. The analysis will include not only the language and cultural habits, but also the social situations, structures and the styles that matter in the way Pentecostalism transforms, and how migrant groups are acculturated within the church.     

Adolescent athletes with learning disability display atypical maturational trajectories on concussion baseline testing: Implications based on a Finnish sample

Previous research has reported lower cognitive test scores on baseline testing in athletes reporting multiple previous concussions or a history of learning disability (LD). Age also has an important influence on cognitive performance. While these factors have been considered individually in previous studies, the present study is the first to explore the interaction of age, self-reported LD, and history of concussion on baseline Immediate Post-Concussion Assessment and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT®) in a nationwide study of adolescent athletes. ImPACT® was administered to 1823 Finnish male ice hockey players (aged 12–21 years old) prior to the 2015–2016 or 2016–2017 playing seasons. Linear regressions and simple slopes analyses were used for clarifying the impact of LD and previous concussion history on maturational trajectories. In comparison to typically developing athletes, athletes with LD had lower neurocognitive scores in all composites and differing maturational trajectory in verbal memory and visual motor speed. The number of previous concussions did not impair neurocognitive performance at baseline assessment. Application of standard age-based norms to adolescent athletes with a history of LD has the potential to negatively skew clinical decision-making. Separate reference values for LD athletes are warranted due to their unique developmental cognitive trajectories. The reference values for the Finnish participants in this study are presented.     

Moral Fetishism Revisited

In this paper the 'moral fetishism' argument originally presented by Michael Smith against moral judgment externalism is defended. I argue that only the internalist views on the relation of moral judgment and motivation can combine two attractive theses: first, that the morally admirable are motivated to act on the reasons they take to ground actions' being right, and second, that their virtuousness need not be diminished by their acting on their thinking something right. Lastly, some possibilities are envisaged for internalists in light of a worry to the effect that the argument, if successful, undermines the internalist theories, too.     

Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists

I explore the prospects of capturing and explaining, within a non-cognitivist framework, the enkratic principle of rationality, according to which (roughly) rationality requires of N that, if N believes that she herself ought to perform an action, φ, N intends to φ. Capturing this principle involves making sense of both the possibility and irrationality of akrasia – of failing to intend in accordance with one’s ought thought. In the first section, I argue that the existing non-cognitivist treatments of enkrasia/akrasia by Allan Gibbard and Michael Ridge are not satisfying. In the second section, I propose that non-cognitivists should perhaps say roughly the following: to think that one ought to φ is to prefer φ-ing to the alternative courses of action, or to have a stronger desire to φ than to choose any alternative action. I outline (building on recent work by Neil Sinhababu) an account of the strength of desire, which allows for the possibility of intending to act against one’s strongest desires, and makes it intelligible why rationality would nevertheless require that one’s strongest desires and intentions be aligned. This would allow the non-cognitivist to explain how akrasia is both possible and irrational. In the last section, I briefly suggest that this leaves non-cognitivists in a nice position in comparison to at least some of the competition, when it comes to capturing enkrasia.     

Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience

Non-naturalism—roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis and incompatible with a purely scientific worldview—faces a difficult challenge with regard to explaining why it is that the normative features of things supervene on their natural features. More specifically: non-naturalists have trouble explaining the necessitation relations, whatever they are, that hold between the natural and the normative. My focus is on Stephanie Leary’s recent response to the challenge, which offers an attempted non-naturalism-friendly explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural by appealing to hybrid properties, the essences of which link them to both natural and sui generis normative properties in suitable ways. I argue that despite its ingenuity, Leary’s solution fails. This is so, I claim, because there are no hybrid properties of the sort that her suggestion appeals to. If non-naturalists are to deal with the supervenience challenge, they will have to find another way of doing so.     

Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes

Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self‐defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successful. I shall also suggest that in order to deal with these worries, Dreier's influential response to the so‐called ‘problem of creeping minimalism’ must be slightly revised.     

Nothing But Stereotypes? Negligible Sex Differences Across Creativity Measures in Science,Arts, and Sports Adolescent High Achievers

Previous research has focused on understanding when, why, and how sex differences in creativity occur, as results vary across samples, measures, and methodologies. In the current study we investigated sex differences in creativity among 984 high achieving adolescents in three expertise areas: Sciences, Arts, and Sports. Eight creativity indicators were analyzed: Alternative uses task (AUT) fluency; creative self-efficacy (CSE); intraindividual strengths (difference between CSE and AUT Fluency); five self-reported creativity scales: Self/everyday, scholarly, performance, mechanical/scientific, artistic. The results showed negligible sex differences ( $n_{\mathrm{p}}^2$ = .01), with females performing better in AUT Fluency and males self-rating their CSE higher. No sex differences were found in self/everyday, scholarly and performance creativity. Males self-rated their mechanical/scientific creativity ( $n_{\mathrm{p}}^2$ = .06) higher than females; while females self-rated their artistic creativity ( $n_{\mathrm{p}}^2$ = .02) higher in comparison to males. Our results extend the existing literature by finding negligible sex differences in adolescent expert groups. However, some stereotypical differences emerged, for example, females with Sciences expertise rated their mechanical/scientific creativity lower than males with and even without Sciences expertise. Results call for further investigation into the links between sex differences, expertise, and specific creativity domains.