Analysis of long-term stress reactions in emergency room patients: An initial study

The psychological stress reactions of 44 family medicine patients who were treated in the emergency room were examined approximately a year after the event. Patients were assessed on several psychological measures, including one for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and on their perception of how stressful the event was initially and now. Results show continuing stress reactions related to the emergency room event. Three patients endorsed symptoms indicating full PTSD and 13 appeared to have at least partial PTSD. Age appeared to be a factor in the presence of stress symptoms and in degree of perceived communication with the physician.     

Praise and prevention

I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome is ensured, the agent whose action explains this non-occurrence is praiseworthy for preventing the outcome. My examples are similar in important respects to Frankfurt-type cases. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the relationship between my examples and Frankfurt-type cases involving both actions and omissions. I conclude that while I may be responsible for the consequences of an action even if those consequences are unavoidable, this is not necessarily so for the consequences of omissions.     

Beyond Data Collection: Ethical Issues in Minority Research

This article examines ethical concerns surrounding research on minority issues. Specifically, it addresses whether researchers have an obligation to consider (a) the impact that minority research can have on vulnerable populations and (b) their own backgrounds before conducting or assessing minority research for publication. The article argues for such an obligation mainly from a consequentialist perspective and then explores possible strategies for assessing and meeting that obligation. Finally, it explores the possible negative secondary effects of those strategies and censorship concerns.     

The effects of collaboration on recall of social information

Three experiments examined the effects of passage type on both individual and collaborative memory performance. In Experiment 1, both individuals and collaborative groups recalled more information from passages containing social information than non-social information. Furthermore, collaborative inhibition (CI) was observed for both types of passages. In Experiment 2, which included a social passage that did not contain gossip, significant main effects of both gossip (gossip > non-gossip) and sociability (explicit > implicit) were observed. As in Experiment 1, CI was observed across all conditions. Experiment 3 separately manipulated gossip and the interest level of the passages and both of these factors enhanced memory performance. Moreover, robust CI was again observed across all conditions. Taken together, the present results demonstrate a mnemonic benefit for social information in individuals and collaborative groups.     

Sex hormone effects on personality at puberty

In this study we use serum steroid hormone assays and Adjective Check List responses from a representative sample of 102 male and 99 female adolescents to examine the relations between hormones, personality, and sexual behavior. We address two questions: (a) Does pubertal testosterone (T) cause sex dimorphism in personality? (b) Do pubertal hormones affect sexual behavior indirectly through effects on personality? Exploratory factor analysis of the Adjective Check List generated a factor common to male and female adolescents that correlated highly with T. However, male and female subjects did not differ in their mean level on this factor or in the correlation of this factor with T. In spite of the large sex difference in T, the girls were much more sensitive than the boys on the extracted factor to differences in T. We conclude that the answer to both questions is probably no.     

Psychopaths and Symmetry: A Reply to Nelkin

Philosophia - An agent is morally competent if she can respond to moral considerations. There is a debate about whether agents are open to moral blame only if they are morally competent, and Dana...     

Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest

I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue.     

Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework

What does it mean to know another person, and how is such knowledge different from other kinds of knowledge? These questions constitute an important part of what I call ‘second‐person epistemology’ – the study of how we know other people. I claim that knowledge of other people is not only central to our everyday lives, but it is a kind of knowledge that is unlike other kinds of knowledge. In general, I will argue that second‐person knowledge arises from repeated interactions with another person, and that it also requires employment of certain cognitive abilities and a unique kind of second‐order knowledge. This paper provides the framework for a second‐person epistemology by examining some of our ordinary claims about what it means to know another person. I describe four conditions that typically characterize knowing another person. Then I describe the psychological grounds of knowing a person. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about the unique symmetries of second person knowledge and the role of such knowledge in our broader epistemological endeavours.