Self-Discrepancies as Predictors of Vulnerability to Distinct Syndromes of Chronic Emotional Distress

Two types of self-discrepancy differing in both domain and standpoint of self-guide were examined as predictors of vulnerability to chronic emotional syndromes. Study 1 assessed discrepancy between the actual/own self-state and the ideal/own self-guide and between the actual/own self-state and the ought/other self-guide in predicting syndromes of dejection and agitation as well as different types of anger. Actual/own: ideal/own discrepancy (AI) was uniquely related to dejection, frustration, and anger at self as measured 2 months later; actual/own:ought/other discrepancy (AOO) was uniquely related to agitation and to anger at others and resentment. Study 2 used structural equation modeling of the relations between AI and AOO discrepancy and social anxiety versus depression as measured weeks later. A model in which AOO was more strongly associated with social anxiety and AI was more strongly associated with depressive symptoms provided the best fit. The results support the convergent and discriminant validity of a self-discrepancy model of vulnerability to chronic emotional syndromes.     

Self-discrepancies in clinical depression and social phobia: cognitive structures that underlie emotional disorders?

Previous research indicates that self-discrepancies are cognitive structures that can induce emotional discomfort. The present study compared clinically depressed and social phobic subjects (plus controls) to determine whether different self-discrepancies were associated with the two disorders. In Part 1, it was shown that the depressives possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ideal/own self-states, whereas the social phobics possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ought/other self-states. In a later, ostensibly unrelated study, subjects responded verbally to questions about other people while their mood changes, skin conductance responses, and verbalizations were recorded. The questions included attributes from the subject's ideal and ought self-states that were mismatches with attributes from his or her actual self, as well as mismatch attributes from other subjects. Priming with self-referential mismatches induced momentary syndromes of dejection or agitation (depending on the type of mismatch). The depressives and social phobics showed the greatest increases in dejection and agitation, respectively, according to their dominant self-discrepancy. The results suggest that specific cognitive structures may underlie clinical depression and anxiety.     

Diagnosis of major depression by self-report

The Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90), Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI), and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test profiles of inpatients and outpatients with DSM-III major depression (n = 48) were contrasted with the test profiles of a control group of patients with diverse psychiatric disorders (n = 68). In addition, the diagnostic efficiency of the relevant depression subscales for the diagnosis of major depression were examined. The results indicated that the three self-report tests may be used to diagnose DSM-III major depression, and that the depressed patients had characteristic test profiles.     

Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: how magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect

Two studies examined whether the type of emotional change experienced by individuals is influenced by the magnitude and accessibility of the different types of self-discrepancies they possess. In both studies, subjects filled out a measure of self-discrepancy a few weeks prior to the experimental session. Subjects were asked to list up to 10 attributes each for different self-states--their actual self, their ideal self (their own or others' hopes and goals for them), and their ought self (their own or others' beliefs about their duty and obligations). Magnitude of self-discrepancy was calculated by comparing the attributes in the actual self to the attributes in either the ideal self or the ought self, with the total number of attribute pairs that matched being subtracted from the total number of attribute pairs that mismatched. In Study 1, subjects were asked to imagine either a positive event or a negative event and were then given a mood measure and a writing-speed task. Subjects with a predominant actual:ideal discrepancy felt more dejected (e.g., sad) and wrote more slowly in the negative event condition than in the positive event condition, whereas subjects with a predominant actual:ought discrepancy, if anything, felt more agitated (e.g., afraid) and wrote more quickly in the negative event condition. In Study 2, subjects were selected who were either high in both kinds of discrepancies or low in both. Half of the subjects in each group were asked to discuss their own and their parents' hopes and goals for them (ideal priming), and the other half were asked to discuss their own and their parents' beliefs concerning their duty and obligations (ought priming). For high-discrepancy subjects, but not low-discrepancy subjects, ideal priming increased their dejection whereas ought priming increased their agitation. The implications of these findings for identifying cognitive-motivational factors that may serve as vulnerability markers for emotional problems is discussed.     

Automatic activation of self-discrepancies and emotional syndromes: when cognitive structures influence affect

Different types of self-discrepancies are associated with different negative affects. Two studies were conducted to determine whether automatic activation of specific actual-self: self-guide mismatches, as cognitive structures, would induce distinct emotional states. Subjects possessing significant discrepancies between their actual self and either their ideal self-guide (attributes that someone wishes or hopes the person would possess) or their ought self-guide (attributes that someone believes the person has the duty or obligation to possess) responded verbally to an audiotape while "thinking about other people." Study 1 involved two kinds of priming attributes: self-relevant and yoked (another subject's self-relevant attributes). Activating mismatches induced momentary syndromes of dejection (sadness, decreased arousal) in ideal-discrepant subjects but induced agitation (nervousness, increased arousal) in ought-discrepant subjects. In Study 2, subjects were randomized to either self-relevant/nondiscrepant, self-discrepant, or yoked priming. The findings of Study 1 were replicated for the self-discrepant priming condition alone. Results indicate that (a) mismatches constitute cognitive structures and (b) automatic activation of different mismatches via contextual priming induces distinct types of emotional discomfort.     

The Doctor(s) in House: An Analysis of the Evolution of the Television Doctor-Hero

The medical drama and its central character, the doctor-hero have been a mainstay of popular television. House M.D. offers a new (and problematic) iteration of the doctor-hero. House eschews the generic conventions of the "television doctor" by being neither the idealized television doctor of the past, nor the more recent competent but often fallible physicians in entertainment texts. Instead, his character is a fragmented text which privileges the biomedical over the personal or emotional with the ultimate goal of scientifically uncovering and resolving instances of disease. This article examines the implicit and explicit messages in House M.D. and critically analyzes both the show and its lead character in relation to the traditional medical drama genre that highlights the "doctor-hero" as the central character. While at first House seems to completely violate narrative and generic norms, ultimately the program provides a new form that reinforces the presence of the doctor-hero, but highlights House's character as the central figure who is personally and interpersonally problematic but biomedically effective.     

Self-discrepancies and vulnerability to body dissatisfaction and disordered eating.

Two studies explored the relevance of self-discrepancies for body dissatisfaction and disordered eating. In Study 1, actual:ideal self-discrepancies of female undergraduates correlated with body shape dissatisfaction independent of Ss' body mass and number of appearance-related self-beliefs; actual:ought discrepancy was discriminantly associated with anorexic-related attitudes and behaviors. In Study 2 (using a mixed-gender sample), bulimic-related behaviors were associated with a form of actual:ideal discrepancy (unfulfilled positive potential) whereas anorexic-related symptoms were associated with actual:ought discrepancy. Both genders showed the predicted relations between self-discrepancies and disordered eating, and the predicted associations remained even when appearance-related attributes were excluded from scoring of self-discrepancies.     

The development of children's ideal and ought self-guides: parenting, temperament, and individual differences in guide strength

Regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) predicts that individual differences in the strength of promotion (ideal) and prevention (ought) orientations emerge from patterns of parent/child interactions that emphasize making good things happen versus keeping bad things from happening. This article examines the development of individual differences in the strength of children's promotion and prevention goals and presents selected findings from three studies exploring the origins of regulatory focus. We found a three-factor structure for parenting behaviors that differentiated between the presence/absence of positive outcomes versus the presence/absence of negative outcomes in two different data sets and validated that factor structure by examining its associations with maternal temperament. In turn, the parenting factors predicted individual differences in children's orientations to ideal and ought guides, and those associations were moderated by individual differences in child temperament.     

Introduction: Social Cognition, Psychodynamic Psychology, and the Representation and Processing of Emotionally Significant Information

ABSTRACT This special issue examines two perspectives on how people comprehend and respond to significant features of their lives: psychoanalytic psychology and social cognition. The articles included present new empirical findings relevant to die overlap of psychoanalysis and social-cognitive psychology, as well as commentaries from each perspective. This introduction summarizes important conceptual and methodological challenges in the integration of two such distinct approaches to emotionally significant information.