Against Pogge's ‘Cosmopolitanism’

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ and correctly states that it is a ‘non‐starter’. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his ‘social justice cosmopolitanism’. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.     

Rodin on Self-Defense and the “Myth” of National Self-Defense: A Refutation

David Rodin denies that defensive wars against unjust aggression can be justified if the unjust aggression limits itself, for example, to the annexation of territory, the robbery of resources or the restriction of political freedom, but would endanger the lives, bodily integrity or freedom from slavery of the citizens only if the unjustly attacked state (or someone else) actually resisted the aggression. I will argue that Rodin’s position is not correct. First, Rodin’s comments on the necessity condition and its relation to an alleged “duty to retreat” misinterpret the law, and a correct interpretation of the law is not only compatible with, but implies a permission to resist the “bloodless invader,” and this is also the correct view from the perspective of morality. Second, Rodin’s remarks on the proportionality of self-defense against conditional threats focus on physical or material harm but implausibly ignore the severity of the violations of autonomy and of the socio-legal or moral order that such conditional threats involve. Third, I will address Rodin’s claim that (“often”) defensive wars against “political aggression” are disproportionate because they risk the lives of those defended in an attempt to secure lesser interests. I will argue that this take on proportionality misses the point in an important respect, namely by confusing wide and narrow proportionality, and makes unwarranted assumptions about the alleged irrationality or impermissibility of incurring or imposing lethal risks to safeguard less vital interests. Next, I will also show that while Rodin talks of a “myth of national self-defense” and of the necessity of moving beyond traditional just war theory and international law, it is actually his interpretation of just war theory and international law that weaves myths. Finally, I will argue that Rodin’s views on national self-defense on the one hand, and “war as law enforcement” on the other, are incoherent.     

The Secret to the Success of the Doctrine of Double Effect (and Related Principles): Biased Framing,Inadequate Methodology,and Clever Distractions

There are different formulations of the doctrine of double effect (DDE), and sometimes philosophers propose “revisions” or alternatives, like the means principle, for instance. To demonstrate that such principles are needed in the first place, one would have to compare cases in which all else is equal and show that the difference in intuitions, if any, can only be explained by the one remaining difference and thus by the principle in question. This is not the methodology defenders of the DDE and of related principles use, however. I will discuss how they actually proceed, focusing on their preferred four pairs of examples. While these examples might have rhetorical force, they are nevertheless philosophically and methodologically useless (since they do not keep all else equal). As a corrective, I shall offer examples that do keep all else equal. These examples undermine the DDE and related principles. I then argue that while the Loop case and the “closeness” problem in the context of Jonathan Bennett’s Sophisticated Bomber example might once have been an embarrassment of sorts for defenders of the DDE, meanwhile their discussion serves as a convenient distraction from the many clear examples disproving the DDE and related principles. I conclude that there is simply no sufficient intuitive support for the DDE or related principles. Instead of looking for their “rationales,” they should be abandoned.     

Border Coercion and ‘Democratic Legitimacy’: On Abizadeh’s Argument Against Current Regimes of Border Control

Res Publica - Arash Abizadeh claims that ‘[a]nyone accepting the democratic theory of political legitimation domestically is thereby committed to rejecting the unilateral domestic right to...     

The use of a laboratory school protocol to evaluate concepts about efficacy and side effects of new formulations of stimulant medications

Recently, new long-acting formulations of racemic methylphenidate (MPH: Ritalin LA, Metadate CD and Concerta) and amphetamine (AMP: Adderall XR) were developed and are now approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In addition, dexmethylphenidate (Focalin), the pharmacologically active d-threo enantiomer of MPH, also was approved by the FDA. In the initial phases of development, prototypes of these five new formulations were evaluated using the University of California, Irvine (UCI) Laboratory School Protocol (LSP), in which surrogate measures of efficacy are collected in highly controlled settings rather than clinical measures of effectiveness in the less-controlled, natural environments of home or school. The LSP studies were followed by large effectiveness and safety studies required for gaining FDA approval. These initial efficacy and side effect studies in the LSP provided missing information about the basic pharmacokinetic (PK) and pharmacodynamic (PD) properties of MPH and AMP and produced some new discoveries (i.e., acute tolerance) that were used to help design the final products. The final once-a-day formulations used different drug delivery systems to achieve long-acting efficacy (Ritalin LA, Metadate CD, Concerta, Adderall XR). All four drug delivery systems were based on two processes: first, a bolus delivery (BD) process to achieve rapid onset of efficacy (mg), and second, a controlled delivery (CD) process to achieve rates of delivery (mg/hr) or a delayed bolus (mg) to maintain efficacy. A theoretical approach was used to compare and contrast the new once-a day formulations of MPH by selecting total daily doses (mg/d) that would equate drug delivery by the first process (mg of the initial bolus) and the second process (mg/hr over specified time period). In addition to efficacy, applications of the LSP to measure common side effects related to eating and sleeping were described and discussed.     

Justifying Defense Against Non-Responsible Threats and Justified Aggressors: the Liability vs. the Rights-Infringement Account

Even among those who find lethal defense against non-responsible threats, innocent aggressors, or justified aggressors justified even in one to one cases, there is a debate as to what the best explanation of this permissibility is. The contenders in this debate are the liability account, which holds that the non-responsible or justified human targets of the defensive measures are liable to attack (that is, they do not have a right not to be attacked), and the justified infringement account, which claims that the targets retain their right not to be attacked but may be attacked anyway, even in one to one situations. Given that we normally think that rights are trumps, this latter claim is counter-intuitive and rather surprising, and therefore in need of justification and explanation. So far only Jonathan Quong has actually tried to provide an explanation; however, I will argue that his explanation fails and that Quong’s own account of liability is misguided. I then address Helen Frowe’s critique of the liability account. She makes the important concession that the tactical bomber (a justified aggressor) has to compensate his victims, but she tries to block the conclusion that he must therefore be liable. I will demonstrate that her attempt to explain away liability fails once that concession is made.