II—Jason Stanley

ABSTRACT The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Narrative discourse after closed head injury in children and adolescents.

This study examined narrative discourse in 20 children and adolescents at least 1 year after sustaining a head injury. Narratives were analyzed along the dimensions of language structure, information structure, and flow of information. Severity of impaired consciousness was associated with a significant reduction in the amount of language and information. The most important finding which emerged was the disruption in information structure. This pattern confirms the impression of disorganized discourse in severely injured children. Explanations for the disruption in information structure are explored in terms of the role of vocabulary, memory, and localization of lesion according to magnetic resonance imaging. In view of recent evidence that frontal lobe damage is associated with discourse formulation deficits in adults and is the most common site of focal lesion in closed head injury, we examined discourse patterns in individual patients with frontal lobe lesions. Preliminary data from our single-case studies suggest discourse patterns similar to those reported for adults with frontal lobe injuries.     

Subjective contours 1900–1990: Research trends and bibliography

Abibliography on subjective contours and a brief summary of trends in research-on-thin problem are presented. The bibliography covers the years 1900–1990 and contains 445 entries, each briefly annotated with a code that indicates the general content and theoretical orientation of the item.     

Evoked potentials and the study of sentence comprehension

Evoked brain potentials were used to monitor moment-by-moment decisions during language comprehension. Subjects read sentences containing temporary syntactic ambiguities for which one of the possible interpretations was semantically implausible. The N400 component of the evoked potential, which is sensitive to implausibility, was used to discover when during a sentence subjects made a decision about the ambiguity. The results demonstrate that readers try to interpret a syntactic ambiguity early in a sentence rather than waiting for disambiguating information. This introduces a new way to use brain activity to study sentence comprehension processes.     

Insight without awareness: On the interaction of verbalization, instruction and practice in a simulated process control task

Four experiments in which subjects learned to control two versions of a complex simulated process control task show that verbalizable knowledge of procedures used to perform these tasks is very limited and is acquired late in learning. Individual learning curves associated with these tasks showed sudden improvements in performance, which were not accompanied by a similar increase in verbalizable knowledge. It was also found that verbal instructions consisting of exemplar memorization, strategies for rule induction, simple heuristics, and experts' instructions were all effective in enhancing novice subjects' performance. A theoretical framework is proposed in which subjects draw on two separate but interacting knowledge structures to perform these tasks. One knowledge structure is based on memory for past experiences (close analogies), and the other is based on one's current mental model of the task. Implicit sets of competing rules that control response selection are derived from both sources of knowledge. It is suggested that dissociations between task performance and verbalizing occur because memory-based processing tends to have more control over response selection because of its greater specificity, whereas a mental model tends to be the preferred mode for verbal reporting because of its greater accessibility.     

The social phobia and anxiety inventory: Construct validity

The Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI) is a new instrument composed of social phobia and agoraphobia subscales. The latter scale is used to detect social anxiety that may result from agoraphobia. The SPAI's construct validity was assessed through several procedures. First, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to validate the existence of the two subscales. Second, exploratory factor analyses examined the underlying structure of the social phobia subscale. Third, a Q factor procedure determined if different anxiety diagnostic groups could be differentiated by their SPAI response pattern. The results confirmed the utility of the two SPAI subscales and identified a number of dimensions contained within the social phobia subscale which differed depending upon the specific subject sample. In addition, the complaints of social phobies appeared more homogeneous than those of an agoraphobic comparison group. The results are discussed in terms of construct validity and the sensitivity of the SPAI to various dimensions of social phobia fears.This study was supported in part by NIMH Grants 41852, 30915, 18269, and 16884.