Am I doing better than you? That depends on whether you ask me in English or Chinese: Self-enhancement effects of language as a cultural mindset prime

Westerners tend to judge themselves positively unless their failure relative to others is obvious, in which case they tend to distance themselves from outperforming others. Whether this tendency to self-enhance in social-comparison situations is universal or culture-bound is hotly debated. Rather than construe self-enhancement as either universal or culture-bound, we propose that its effects depend on the cultural mindset that is salient at the moment of self-reflection. A cultural mindset is a mental representation containing culture-congruent content, procedures, and goals. We focused on individual and collective mindsets, using language as an unobtrusive mindset prime and predicting that people would be more self-enhancing when an individual mindset was made salient by using English than when a collective mindset was made salient by using Chinese. Three studies supported this hypothesis. Chinese students self-enhanced (rating themselves as better than others and distancing themselves from outperforming others) more when primed with an individual mindset.     

Exemplary cases in clinical ethics: commentary on the case of Mr. A

A commentary on a case of a man who is left a "high quad" (ventilator dependant as well as quadriplegic) after an accident discusses the following: The right of patients who sustain catastrophic injuries to choose to discontinue life-sustaining treatment, The role of capacity assessment in treatment decisions and in ethics consultations, The role of advance directives (ADs) for such patients if they lack capacity, Whether a do-not-resuscitate or do-not-attempt-resuscitation order should be seen as "a medical order" or an advance directive, Some hints about what might be intended when a patient refers to the criterion of having a "meaningful life."     

Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism

Do differences in individualism and collectivism influence values, self-concept content, relational assumptions, and cognitive style? On the one hand, the cross-national literature provides an impressively consistent picture of the predicted systematic differences; on the other hand, the nature of the evidence is inconclusive. Cross-national evidence is insufficient to argue for a causal process, and comparative data cannot specify if effects are due to both individualism and collectivism, only individualism, only collectivism, or other factors (including other aspects of culture). To address these issues, the authors conducted a meta-analysis of the individualism and collectivism priming literature, with follow-up moderator analyses. Effect sizes were moderate for relationality and cognition, small for self-concept and values, robust across priming methods and dependent variables, and consistent in direction and size with cross-national effects. Results lend support to a situated model of culture in which cross-national differences are not static but dynamically consistent due to the chronic and moment-to-moment salience of individualism and collectivism. Examination of the unique effects of individualism and collectivism versus other cultural factors (e.g., honor, power) awaits the availability of research that primes these factors.     

How to Assess a Model's Testability and Identifiability

Formal definitions are given of the following intuitive concepts: (a) A model is quantitatively testable if its predictions are highly precise and narrow. (b) A model is identifiable if the values of its parameters can be ascertained from empirical observations. (c) A model is redundant if the values of some parameters can be deduced from others or if the values of some observables can be deduced from others. Various rules of thumb for nonredundant models are examined. The Counting Rule states that a model is quantitatively testable if and only if it has fewer parameters than observables. This rule can be safely applied only to identifiable models. If a model is unidentifiable, one must apply a generalization of the Counting Rule known as the Jacobian Rule. This rule states that a model is quantitatively testable if and only if the maximum rank (i.e., the number of linearly independent columns) of its Jacobian matrix (i.e., the matrix of partial derivatives of the function that maps parameter values to the predicted values of observables) is smaller than the number of observables. The Identifiability Rule states that a model is identifiable if and only if the maximum rank of its Jacobian matrix equals the number of parameters. The conclusions provided by these rules are only presumptive. To reach definitive conclusions, additional analyses must be performed. To illustrate the foregoing, the quantitative testability and identifiability of linear models and of discrete-state models are analyzed. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.