Factor structure and reliability of the Spanish adaptation of the Children's Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale--Self Report (CY-BOCS-SR)

The aim of this study was the adaptation to Spanish of the ?Children's Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale--Self Report? (CY-BOCS-SR), one of the most frequently utilized scales in the assessment of obsessive-compulsive behaviors. After its translation to Spanish, its factor invariance in boys and girls, reliability, and relationship with the children's age were examined. Lastly, normative data for this Spanish version are presented. The sample comprised 1,706 children and adolescents from the general population. Results show that the factor composition of the CY-BOCS-SR does not present a very good fit to the usual scoring of three scales were observed: Obsession Severity, Compulsion Severity, and total score. Results also show that the factor validity and reliability of the CY-BOCS-SR improve remarkably if items related to Resistance to Obsessions and Compulsions are considered a different factor from Severity. It is concluded that the Spanish version of the CY-BOCS-SR has similar psychometric characteristics as the original English version.     

Chisholm's Epistemic Principles

Abstract: An exposition and discussion of Chisholm's “epistemic principles.” These are compared with relevant views of Wilfrid Sellars and Richard Foley. A further comparison, with the approach favored by Descartes, is argued to throw light on the status of such principles.     

Are There Two Grades of Knowledge?

A response to Sosa's criticisms of Sellars's account of the relation between knowledge and experience, noting that Sellars excludes merely animal knowledge, and hopes to bypass epistemology by an adequate philosophy of mind and language.     

Replies to comments on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Judgment and Agency</Emphasis>

This paper is part of a book symposium on my Judgment and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2015). Here I reply to the comments of three commentators: Jason Baehr, Imogen Dickie, and Hilary Kornblith.     

Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium.     

Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.