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Sobhi Rayan 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(6):1047-1065
This article deals with the concepts of translation and interpretation in Ibn Taymiyya's Theory of Definition. Translation is replacement of one name by another or of one named object by another, while, Interpretation is replacement of one name by a named object or of a named object by a name. The relationship between the definition and the definiendum is decided by the law of al-Tard wa al-'Aks (coextensiveness-cumcoexclusiveness) that looks at objects from all sides and decides the traits of the definiendum. It also aims at deciding the signification of the name and this is also the aim of the definition. Since the ‘name’; is a linguistic matter, the definition is related to the signification of the name and its language. 相似文献
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Sobhi Rayan 《国际科学哲学研究》2009,23(2):123-141
I endeavour in this article to present Ibn Taymiyya's theory of nominal definition as an alternative to logical definition. Ibn Taymiyya argues that nominal definition is based on concrete principles that are subject to experiment. Furthermore, the function of definition is akin to the ‘name’ because it aims at distinguishing any one object from others but not at reaching the entity of things. Nominal definition aims to define the name or the named, and this aim can be achieved by translation or by interpretation. Translation is the movement from one name to another or from one named object to another. Interpretation is movement from a name to a named object or from a named object to a name. 相似文献
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Sobhi Rayan 《Theology & Science》2013,11(2):255-268
The present article aims at analyzing the terms “necessity” (Al-darura) and “habit” (al-āda) in al-Ghazali's (1058?–?1111) theory of natural causality (Al-Sbābiah al-Tabī'īa) by answering the following question: Why does Al-Ghazali use term “habit” and negation of “necessity” with regard to natural Causality? Al-Ghazali denies causal necessity that links cause and effect since this relationship does not draw on logical rules that make it necessary. This, however, does not mean that he denies the existence of a causal relationship between things, as he recognizes its existence. He, however, denies the necessity of that relationship, as he claims that the source of causal necessity stems from a psychological emotion rather than from being inherent in things themselves. Al-Ghazali also attempts to base causal necessity on “habit” by claiming that the similarity of event A as cause and event B as effect stems from observation, repetition and the sequencing of natural phenomena. Al-Ghazali, then, endeavors to prove that science is based on expectation and assumption that draws on observation, the senses, and repetition and does not consider it as constant and absolute. 相似文献
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