Reichenbach’s cubical universe and the problem of the external world

This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention.     

Causal,A Priori True,and Explanatory: A Reply to Lange and Rosenberg

Sober [2011 Sober, E. 2011. A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/4: 571–89.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] argues that some causal statements are a priori true and that a priori causal truths are central to explanations in the theory of natural selection. Lange and Rosenberg [2011 Lange, M. and Rosenberg, A. 2011. Can There Be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89/4: 591–9.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]] criticize Sober's argument. They concede that there are a priori causal truths, but maintain that those truths are only ‘minimally causal’. They also argue that explanations that are built around a priori causal truths are not causal explanations, properly speaking. Here we criticize both of Lange and Rosenberg's claims.     

Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View

Philosophical Studies -     

Plantinga's Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism

In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function , Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N . The hypothesis E says that "human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention" (p. 220). With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says "it isn't easy to say precisely what naturalism is," but then adds that "crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is no such person as the God of traditional theism." Plantinga tries to cast doubt on the conjunction E&N in two ways. His "preliminary argument" aims to show that the conjunction is probably false, given the fact ( R ) that our psychological mechanisms for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable. His "main argument" aims to show that the conjunction E&N is self-defeating – if you believe E&N , then you should stop believing that conjunction. Plantinga further develops the main argument in his unpublished paper "Naturalism Defeated" (Plantinga 1994). We will try to show that both arguments contain serious errors.