Lies,lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions

To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence — does not expression a true proposition are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.     

Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

A theory of right action is implicit in Hume's delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to 'rules of justice' as Hume's remarks on 'that species of utility which attends this virtue' require. It is a useful actual-rule, not an ideal possible-rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in 'extraordinary cases', has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question 'Why not hark directly to the supreme law of utility in every case?'. It does not reflect contractarian considerations of mutuality of interests evident in Hume's texts, which while sometimes relevant to what is reasonable, are in his view never also relevant to what is moral.     

Pascalian wagers

A person who does not have good intellectual reasons for believing in God can, depending on his probabilities and values for consequences of believing, have good practical reasons. Pascalian wagers founded on a variety of possible probability/value profiles are examined from a Bayesian perspective central to which is the idea that states and options are pragmatically reasonable only if they maximize subjective expected value. Attention is paid to problems posed by representations of values by Cantorian infinities. An appendix attends to Robinsonian hyperreals. Another appendix presents for comparison Newcomb's Problem and a problem in some ways like it suggested, I think, by ideas of John Calvin.     

Non-dominance,third person and non-action Newcomb problems,and metatickles

It is plausible that Newcomb problems in which causal maximizers and evidential maximizers would do different things would not be possible for ideal maximizers who are attentive to metatickles. An objection to Eells's first argument for this makes welcome a second. Against it I argue that even ideal evidential and causal maximizers would do different things in some non-dominance Newcomb problems; and that they would hope for different things in some third-person and non-action problems, which is relevant if a good theory of rational choices of acts should fit smoothly into a good theory of rational desires for facts.This paper elaborates on Section V of Sobel. forthcoming.     

The Process of Family Reconstruction after DNA Testing for Huntington Disease

The needs of families to reconstruct their relationships in response to the DNA testing for Huntington disease of one or more of their asymptomatic members are presented. Data were collected from family interviews with 18 families, and from their responses on a post interview questionnaire. Findings are that families need to (a) address unfinished business associated with the decision for testing; (b) bring family members, peripheral in the decision for testing, into the loop; (c) reorganize patterns of communication and roles altered by the testing and heal ruptures in family membership; and (d) revise family stories about illness to provide a meaning for HD and explain the test results in a way that leaves them with a sense of mastery. Findings suggest that families should be more involved in the initial decision for testing of a member and that protocols should be established to provide help for their ongoing adjustment.     

Neural synergy between kinetic vision and touch

Ambiguous visual information often produces unstable visual perception. In four psychophysical experiments, we found that unambiguous tactile information about the direction of rotation of a globe whose three-dimensional structure is ambiguous significantly influences visual perception of the globe. This disambiguation of vision by touch occurs only when the two modalities are stimulated concurrently, however. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we discovered that touching the rotating globe, even when not looking at it, reliably activates the middle temporal visual area (MT+), a brain region commonly thought to be crucially involved in registering structure from motion. Considered together, our results show that the brain draws on somatosensory information to resolve visual conflict.     

The importance of decision making in causal learning from interventions

Recent research has focused on how interventions benefit causal learning. This research suggests that the main benefit of interventions is in the temporal and conditional probability information that interventions provide a learner. But when one generates interventions, one must also decide what interventions to generate. In three experiments, we investigated the importance of these decision demands to causal learning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that learners were better at learning causal models when they observed intervention data that they had generated, as opposed to observing data generated by another learner. Experiment 2 demonstrated the same effect between self-generated interventions and interventions learners were forced to make. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when learners observed a sequence of interventions such that the decision-making process that generated those interventions was more readily available, learning was less impaired. These data suggest that decision making may be an important part of causal learning from interventions.