Social uncertainty and interdependence: A study of resource allocation decisions in groups

Social uncertainty about the behavior of others with whom one is interdependent for rewards is hypothesized to encourage self-interested behavior and inhibit behavioral commitment to the group. This paper examines the roles of uncertainty, expectations, and feedback about other group members' contributions to the group in interdependent decision making. In the absence of feedback, resources tend to be divided between individual and group interests. Resource allocations to the group are found to increase significantly if group members receive feedback about other members' allocations, particularly if that feedback is at the individual level, not an aggregated group level. However, the effects of feedback presence and type are eliminated when group members state their expectations about other members' future contributions to the group. Implications for expectancy value theories of motivation and commitment to groups in organizations are discussed.     

Confidence depends on level of aggregation

The credible intervals that people set around their point estimates are typically too narrow (cf. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). That is, a set of many such intervals does not contain the actual values of the criterion variables as often as it should given the probability assigned to this event for each estimate. The typical interpretation of such data is that people are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments. This paper presents data from two studies showing the typical levels of overconfidence for individual estimates of unknown quantities. However, data from the same subjects on a different measure of confidence for the same items, their own global assessment for the set of multiple estimates as a whole, showed significantly lower levels of confidence and overconfidence than their average individual assessment for items in the set. It is argued that the event and global assessments of judgment quality are fundamentally different and are affected by unique psychological processes. Finally, we discuss the implications of a difference between confidence in single and multiple estimates for confidence research and theory.     

Rearing practices and impulsivity/hyperactivity symptoms in relation to inflated responsibility and obsessive‐compulsive symptoms

Smári, J., Rúrik Martinsson, D., & Einarsson, H. (2010). Rearing practices and impulsivity/hyperactivity symptoms in relation to inflated responsibility and obsessive‐compulsive symptoms. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 392–397. The aim of the study was to investigate potential precursors of inflated responsibility (responsibility attitudes) and obsessive‐compulsive (OCD) symptoms. It was argued that both parental overprotection and impulsivity, separately and in interaction with each other, contribute to inflated responsibility and OCD symptoms. In a large sample of young adults (N = 570), self‐report measures of OCD symptoms (OCI‐R), responsibility attitudes (RAS), anxiety/depression (HADS), rearing practices (EMBU), present and past impulsivity/hyperactivity symptoms (IMP/HY) were administered. Overprotection as well as IMP/HY were found to predict OCD symptoms as well as inflated responsibility. Finally, a significant interaction was found between IMP/HY and overprotection with regard to both OCD symptoms and inflated responsibility. This effect reflected that IMP/HY was more strongly related to OCD symptoms and responsibility in people who had not been overprotected than in people who had been. Conversely overprotection was related to OCD symptoms and responsibility in people low but not in people high in IMP/HY. The results seem to indicate that the inadequacy between offer and need for parental control may play a role in the development of OCD symptoms.     

Judgment processes in motivation: Anchoring and adjustment effects on judgment and behavior

The behavioral correlates of human judgment have received little attention from judgment and decision making researchers. One behavioral domain that provides for the study of judgment-behavior relations is task motivation (i.e., the allocation of time and effort to a task). Judgments of contingent relations are primary components of several theories of motivation, including expectancy theories and the theory of behavior in organizations proposed by Naylor, Pritchard, and Ilgen (1980). The characteristics of heuristic judgment processes are hypothesized to affect contingency judgments and thus behavioral allocations of time and effort. This paper examines the effects of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic upon (a) judgments of future effort and performance and (b) upon actual allocations of time and effort using several types of anchoring information. Results indicate that both irrelevant and relevant information have strong anchoring effects on effort and performance judgments, but do not have concomitant effects on behavior. Implications for the role of judgment in motivation and for the link between judgment and behavior are discussed.     

Conflict of Interests and Commitment in Groups1

Behavioral commitment levels of group members were examined under conflict of interests between individual and collective tasks in a work-group scenario. Commitment was conceptualized as the amount of time and effort resources that individuals chose to allocate to the group task. Seventeen groups of three allocated 100 time and effort resource units to individual and group tasks for each of four trials. The level of commitment to group work increased, partially because over-rewarded persons increased group contributions more than underrewarded persons decreased them. However, the variance of allocations to the group task did not decrease over trials. Potential implications of the findings for organizational research and practice concerning work groups are discussed in terms of the roles of equity, comparative referent use, and information exchange.     

Trust, Confidence, and Expertise in a Judge-Advisor System

The relationship between trust, confidence, and expertise in Judge-Advisor Systems is examined in two experiments with Judge-Advisor pairs, one with strangers and another with participants in ongoing relationships. There was expertise asymmetry so that Judges had less expertise than their Advisors. The dyads could receive money for accurate Judge decisions. Either the Judge or Advisor had the power to allocate this money between dyad members, before task interaction in study one and after task completion in study two. Because Judges were more dependent on Advisors than vice versa, it was predicted that trust would be more important to Judges. Results were supportive. Judges had higher and more variable ratings of trust in their partner than did Advisors, suggesting that Judges were more motivated to evaluate trust. High confidence by Advisors had a positive impact on Judges' ratings of trust and tendency to follow their advice. Judges' trust in their Advisors was significantly related their taking the advice and being confident in their final decisions. Although participants in study two had higher levels of trust in their partners, they allocated less money to them. The implications for establishing trust are discussed.     

Improving judgement with prepaid expert advice

Decision makers (“Judges”) often make decisions after obtaining advice from an Advisor. The two parties often share a psychological “contract” about what each contributes in expertise to the decision and receives in monetary outcomes from it. In a laboratory experiment, we varied Advisor Experitise and the opportunity for monetary rewards. As expected, these manipulations influenced advice quality, advice taking, and Judge post‐advice decision quality. The main contribution of the study, however, was the manipulation of the timing of monetary rewards (before or after the advising interaction). We found, as predicted, that committing money for expert—but not novice—advice increases Judges' use of advice and their subsequent estimation accuracy. Implications for advice giving and taking are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Feature cues in probability learning: Data base information and judgment

Judgments of probabilistic events are often based partly on some information about past similar events. This study investigates the impact of summarized historical data termed a feature cue on performance in a cue probability learning task. Judges (n = 64) made 150 predictions of a criterion variable (Y_e) from a single cue variable (X). The feature cue variable (Z) provided judges with the “average past criterion” for the cue value on trial i, i.e., the conditional mean . Availability of the feature cue was varied with an AB-BA transfer design. Results demonstrate that the presence of the feature cue greatly imporved prediction achievement and accuracy. Under certain conditions, consistency and cue weighting were also improved by the feature cue aid. Although the feature cue value itself was not used as a prediction, it served as an anchor, around which judgments were dispersed. Implications for decision making with data base information are discussed.