Wisselende grense: visuele kuns en alledaagse aktiwiteit

Kontemporêre visuele kuns sluit toenemend aktiwiteite in wat die terrein van alledaagse aktiwiteit betree. Insgelyks penetreer estetiese begrippe wat voorheen tot die kunsdissipline beperk was die sfeer van bestaansroetine en selfs beroepsterreine soos besigheidsbestuur wat voorheen as onversoenbaar met die kunste beskou was. Die gevolg is dat die konvensionele grense tussen kunsaktiwiteit, en enige ander aktiwiteit, ook die skryf van tekste oor die visuele kuns, onder druk verkeer en ernstige vrae oor die wesenlike inhoud van kuns en selfs die behoud van die kategorie ‘kuns’ ontstaan. Met, as vertrekpunt, die uitsprake en kunsaktiwiteite van die Duitse ‘beeldhouer’, Joseph Beuys, word 'n oorsig aangebied van die wisselwerking tussen visuele kunsvorme en ander alledaagse aktiwiteite. Die implikasies van hierdie transgressie van grense vir oproepe om 'n her-mitologisering van kuns en die aansluitende rekonstruksie van die waardestelsels van die gemeenskap word uit 'n aantal perspektiewe belig, en enkele aansluitende filosofiese interpretasies van die funksie en doel van kunsaktiwiteit word gebruik om die begrip 'artistieke deelname' in reliëf te plaas.     

Quantity-based judgments in the domestic dog (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis lupus familiaris</Emphasis>)

We examined the ability of domestic dogs to choose the larger versus smaller quantity of food in two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigated the ability of 29 dogs (results from 18 dogs were used in the data analysis) to discriminate between two quantities of food presented in eight different combinations. Choices were simultaneously presented and visually available at the time of choice. Overall, subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity, but they found numerically close comparisons more difficult. In experiment 2, we tested two dogs from experiment 1 under three conditions. In condition 1, we used similar methods from experiment 1 and tested the dogs multiple times on the eight combinations from experiment 1 plus one additional combination. In conditions 2 and 3, the food was visually unavailable to the subjects at the time of choice, but in condition 2, food choices were viewed simultaneously before being made visually unavailable, and in condition 3, they were viewed successively. In these last two conditions, and especially in condition 3, the dogs had to keep track of quantities mentally in order to choose optimally. Subjects still chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity when the food was not simultaneously visible at the time of choice. Olfactory cues and inadvertent cuing by the experimenter were excluded as mechanisms for choosing larger quantities. The results suggest that, like apes tested on similar tasks, some dogs can form internal representations and make mental comparisons of quantity.     

The feels good theory of pleasure

Most philosophers since Sidgwick have thought that the various forms of pleasure differ so radically that one cannot find a common, distinctive feeling among them. This is known as the heterogeneity problem. To get around this problem, the motivational theory of pleasure suggests that what makes an experience one of pleasure is our reaction to it, not something internal to the experience. I argue that the motivational theory is wrong, and not only wrong, but backwards. The heterogeneity problem is the principal source of motivation for this, otherwise, highly counterintuitive theory. I intend to show that the heterogeneity problem is not a genuine problem and that a more straightforward theory of pleasure is forthcoming. I argue that the various experiences that we call “pleasures” all feel good.     

To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living

David Benatar argues that being brought into existence is always a net harm and never a benefit. I disagree. I argue that if you bring someone into existence who lives a life worth living (LWL), then you have not all things considered wronged her. Lives are worth living if they are high in various objective goods and low in objective bads. These lives constitute a net benefit. In contrast, lives worth avoiding (LWA) constitute a net harm. Lives worth avoiding are net high in objective bads and low in objective goods. It is the prospect of a LWA that gives us good reason to not bring someone into existence. Happily, many lives are not worth avoiding. Contra Benatar, many are indeed worth living. Even if we grant Benatar his controversial asymmetry thesis, we have no reason to think that coming into existence is always a net harm.     

The Ethics of Humor: Can Your Sense of Humor be Wrong?

I distill three somewhat interrelated approaches to the ethical criticism of humor: (1) attitude-based theories, (2) merited-response theories, and (3) emotional responsibility theories. I direct the brunt of my effort at showing the limitations of the attitudinal endorsement theory by presenting new criticisms of Ronald de Sousa’s position. Then, I turn to assess the strengths of the other two approaches, showing that that their major formulations implicitly require the problematic attitudinal endorsement theory. I argue for an effects-mediated responsibility theory, holding that the strongest ethical criticism that can be made of our sense of humor is that it might indicate some omission on our part. This omission could only be culpable in so far as a particular joke could do harm to oneself or others. In response to Ted Cohen’s doubts that such a mechanism of harm is forthcoming, I argue that the primary vehicle of the harmful effects of humor is laughter.     

The Good Cause Account of the Meaning of Life

I defend the theory that one's life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good. Call this the good cause account (GCA) of the meaning of life. It holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one's life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good. I argue that the best theory of the meaning of life should clearly distinguish between subjective fulfillment and objective meaningfulness. The GCA respects the distinction. And it is superior to its leading rivals in the recent literature, most notably those of Erik Wielenberg and Susan Wolf.