Why families of children with biological deficits require a systems approach.

A number of assumptions related to the systemic therapists' view of family functioning in the case of biological deficit in the child are presented and challenged. The families' behavior, it is argued, may not be primarily responsible for the difficulties of their biologically impaired offspring. Severity of handicap need not be directly linked to stress in these families, nor is avoiding an individual diagnosis helpful to them. To further clarify the relevant issues, the family's "reactions" to a dysfunctional member, along with the professionals' previously unhelpful approaches to dealing with the impairment of these children, are presented. Finally, the therapeutic implications of the position presented in this article are drawn, and specific recommendations for working with these families are offered.     

Attachment,social rank,and affect regulation: speculations on an ethological approach to family interaction

The attachment and social rank systems are biological-evolutionary systems that can serve as models for conceptualizing family interaction. By exploring both their unique and interrelated impact on affect regulation, we can differentiate between processes that foster healthy growth and those leading to individual psychopathology. This perspective facilitates the integration of biological and psychological models, and has therapeutic implications. It also integrates well with other family therapy models.     

Recent exposure affects artifact naming

Deciding how to label an object depends both on beliefs about the culturally appropriate name and on memory. A label should be consistent with a language community's norms, but those norms can be used only if they can be retrieved. Two experiments are reported in which we tested the hypothesis that immediate prior exposure to familiar objects and their names affects how an ambiguous target object is named. Exposure to a typical instance of one name category was pitted against exposure to one or two instances from a contrasting category. When the contrast set consisted of a neighbor of the target, naming was usually consistent with the contrast category. This effect was reduced when a typical instance of the contrast category was also exposed. In Experiment 2, the exposure set was varied to include conditions in which either the neighbor or a prototypical instance was paired with an instance dissimilar to the target. The results suggest that all recently exposed objects affect name choice in proportion to their similarity to the target.     

Assessing the causal structure of function

Theories typically emphasize affordances or intentions as the primary determinant of an object's perceived function. The HIPE theory assumes that people integrate both into causal models that produce functional attributions. In these models, an object's physical structure and an agent's action specify an affordance jointly, constituting the immediate causes of a perceived function. The object's design history and an agent's goal in using it constitute distant causes. When specified fully, the immediate causes are sufficient for determining the perceived function--distant causes have no effect (the causal proximity principle). When the immediate causes are ambiguous or unknown, distant causes produce inferences about the immediate causes, thereby affecting functional attributions indirectly (the causal updating principle). Seven experiments supported HIPE's predictions.     

Causal explanation in the face of contradiction

Previous work has shown that predictions can be mediated by mechanistic beliefs. The present study shows that such mediation only occurs in the face of contradictory, and not corroborative, evidence. In four experiments, we presented participants with causal statements describing a common-cause structure (E₁←C→E₂). Then we informed them of the states of C and E₁ and asked them to judge the likelihood of E₂. In Experiments 1 and 2, we manipulated whether the mechanisms supporting the two effects were the same or different, and whether the evidence presented confirmed or contradicted the participants’ expectations. The relation between the mechanisms only influenced predictions when evidence contradicted the expectations, but not when it was consistent. In Experiments 3 and 4, we used a common-cause structure with identical mechanisms. We manipulated the order in which predictions were made. When confirmatory predictions were made before contradictory predictions, mechanistic modulation was not observed in the confirmatory case. In contrast, the modulation was found when confirmatory predictions were made after contradictory ones. The results support the contradiction hypothesis that causal structure is revised during prediction, but only in the face of unexpected evidence.     

EFFECTS OF TREATMENT INTEGRITY FAILURES DURING DIFFERENTIAL REINFORCEMENT OF ALTERNATIVE BEHAVIOR: A TRANSLATIONAL MODEL

Differential reinforcement of alternative behavior (DRA) is used frequently as a treatment for problem behavior. Previous studies on treatment integrity failures during DRA suggest that the intervention is robust, but research has not yet investigated the effects of different types of integrity failures. We examined the effects of two types of integrity failures on DRA, starting with a human operant procedure and extending the results to children with disabilities in a school setting. Human operant results (Experiment 1) showed that conditions involving reinforcement for problem behavior were more detrimental than failing to reinforce appropriate behavior alone, and that condition order affected the results. Experiments 2 and 3 replicated the effects of combined errors and sequence effects during actual treatment implementation.     

Frequency illusions and other fallacies

[Cosmides and Tooby, 1996] increased performance using a frequency rather than probability frame on a problem known to elicit base-rate neglect. Analogously, [Gigerenzer, 1994] claimed that the conjunction fallacy disappears when formulated in terms of frequency rather than the more usual single-event probability. These authors conclude that a module or algorithm of mind exists that is able to compute with frequencies but not probabilities. The studies reported here found that base-rate neglect could also be reduced using a clearly stated single-event probability frame and by using a diagram that clarified the critical nested-set relations of the problem; that the frequency advantage could be eliminated in the conjunction fallacy by separating the critical statements so that their nested relation was opaque; and that the large effect of frequency framing on the two problems studied is not stable. Facilitation via frequency is a result of clarifying the probabilistic interpretation of the problem and inducing a representation in terms of instances, a form that makes the nested-set relations amongst the problem components transparent.     

Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence

Conceptual features differ in how mentally tranformable they are. A robin that does not eat is harder to imagine than a robin that does not chirp. We argue that features are immutable to the extent that they are central in a network of dependency relations. The immutability of a feature reflects how much the internal structure of a concept depends on that feature; i.e., how much the feature contributes to the concept's coherence. Complementarily, mutability reflects the aspects in which a concept is flexible. We show that features can be reliably ordered according to their mutability using tasks that require people to conceive of objects missing a feature, and that mutability (conceptual centrality) can be distinguished from category centrality and from diagnosticity and salience. We test a model of mutability based on asymmetric, unlabeled, pairwise dependency relations. With no free parameters, the model provides reasonable fits to data. Qualitative tests of the model show that mutability judgments are unaffected by the type of dependency relation and that dependency structure influences judgments of variability.     

The probability of causal conditionals

Conditionals in natural language are central to reasoning and decision making. A theoretical proposal called the Ramsey test implies the conditional probability hypothesis: that the subjective probability of a natural language conditional, P(if p then q), is the conditional subjective probability, P(q/p). We report three experiments on causal indicative conditionals and related counterfactuals that support this hypothesis. We measured the probabilities people assigned to truth table cases, P(pq), P(p notq), P( notpq) and P( notp notq). From these ratings, we computed three independent predictors, P(p), P(q/p) and P(q/ notp), that we then entered into a regression equation with judged P(if p then q) as the dependent variable. In line with the conditional probability hypothesis, P(q/p) was by far the strongest predictor in our experiments. This result is inconsistent with the claim that causal conditionals are the material conditionals of elementary logic. Instead, it supports the Ramsey test hypothesis, implying that common processes underlie the use of conditionals in reasoning and judgments of conditional probability in decision making.     

A causal model theory of the meaning of cause, enable, and prevent

The verbs cause , enable , and prevent express beliefs about the way the world works. We offer a theory of their meaning in terms of the structure of those beliefs expressed using qualitative properties of causal models, a graphical framework for representing causal structure. We propose that these verbs refer to a causal model relevant to a discourse and that "A causes B" expresses the belief that the causal model includes a link from A to B. "A enables/allows B" entails that the model includes a link from A to B, that A represents a category of events necessary for B, and that an alternative cause of B exists. "A prevents B" entails that the model includes a link from A to B and that A reduces the likelihood of B. This theory is able to account for the results of four experiments as well as a variety of existing data on human reasoning.