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Neil Sinhababu 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2015,96(2):165-180
Propositionalism is the view that the contents of intentional attitudes have a propositional structure. Objectualism opposes propositionalism in allowing the contents of these attitudes to be ordinary objects or properties. Philosophers including Talbot Brewer, Paul Thagard, Michelle Montague, and Alex Grzankowski attack propositionalism about such attitudes as desire, liking, and fearing. This article defends propositionalism, mainly on grounds that it better supports psychological explanations. 相似文献
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Neil Sinhababu 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(3):278-299
Nietzsche takes moral judgments to be false beliefs, and encourages us to pursue subjective nonmoral value arising from our passions. His view that strong and unified passions make one virtuous is mathematically derivable from this subjectivism and a conceptual analysis of virtue, explaining his evaluations of character and the nature of the Overman. 相似文献
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Philosophia - Justin Remhof defends a constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche’s view regarding the metaphysics of material objects. First, I describe an attractive feature of... 相似文献
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Neil Sinhababu 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2013,94(2):152-165
Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I argue against this view with counterexamples showing that applying the norm of truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for distinguishing believing from imagining and assuming. Then I argue that the different functional properties of these mental states are enough to distinguish them, and that norm‐application doesn't help us draw the functional distinctions. 相似文献
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Neil Sinhababu 《Philosophical Studies》2018,175(12):3131-3144
Rightness and wrongness come in degrees that vary on a continuous scale. Examples in which agents have many options that morally differ from each other demonstrate this. I suggest ways to develop scalar consequentialism, which treats the rightness and wrongness of actions as matters of degree, and explains them in terms of the value of the actions’ consequences. Scalar consequentialism has a variety of linguistic resources for understanding unsuffixed “right.” It also has advantages over some deontological theories in accounting for rightness. 相似文献
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