The influence of only on syntactic processing of "long" relative clause sentences

We report an eye movement experiment investigating the influence of the focus operator only on syntactic processing of "long" relative clause sentences. Paterson, Liversedge, and Underwood (1999) found that readers were garden pathed by "short" reduced relative clause sentences containing the focus operator only . They argued that due to thematic differences between "short" and "long" relative clause sentences, garden path effect might not occur when "long" reduced relative clause sentences are read. Eye-tracking data show that garden path effects found during initial processing of the disambiguating verb of "long" reduced sentences without only were absent or delayed in the case of counterparts with only . We discuss our results in terms of current theories of sentence processing.     

Deconstructing the Tower of London: Alternative moves and conflict resolution as predictors of task performance

Despite widespread use the cognitive demands of the five-disc Tower of London (TOL) are unknown. Research suggests that conflict moves (those that are essential to the solution but do not place a disc in its final position) are a key aspect of performance. These were examined in three studies via a verification paradigm, in which normal participants were asked to decide whether a demonstrated move was correct. Experiment 1 showed that individual move latencies increase with the number of intermediate moves until the disc is placed in its goal position (resolution). Post hoc tests suggested that the number of alternative moves and moves to resolve a disc were independent predictors of performance. Experiment 2 successfully manipulated these factors in an experimental design. Experiment 3 showed that they remain determinants of performance as familiarity increased. Overall, errors on the task were significantly correlated with spatial memory. The implications of these findings for the use of the TOLin cognitive psychology and as an assessment tool are discussed.     

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.

     

Focused search of semantic cases in question answering

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people can execute focused searches of semantic cases when answering questions about complex facts, such as “the teacher watered the peas, the corn, and the lettuce with the hose.” In Experiment 1, answer time varied mainly with the number of concepts in the relevant or focused case, supporting the hypothesis. Experiment 2 indicated that the irrelevant case undergoes some processing. Experiment 3 confirmed that search in Experiments 1 and 2 focused on semantic cases rather than on taxonomic categories. It is proposed that focused memory search has a high probability of retrieving the relevant case and a low probability of retrieving the irrelevant case. In the latter event, the irrelevant concepts receive full processing.     

Why do people need self-esteem? Converging evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.     

Acceptance of Labels for Behavioral Response-Reduction Procedures and the Users of Those Procedures

The Psychological Record - The acceptability of labels for behavioral response-reduction procedures and the users of those procedures was evaluated. Introductory psychology students read a lesson...