Self-Consciousness,Self-presentation,and Performance Under Pressure: Who Chokes,and When?

Choking under pressure by persons low and high in self-consciousness was examined as a function of two sources of performance pressure: audience and performance feedback. Subjects competed with an alleged opponent on a psychomotor task while alone, before a supportive (same team) audience, or a nonsupportive (opposing team) audience. Before the critical trial, subjects learned that their team was either somewhat ahead of or somewhat behind the opposing team. Self-consciousness, audience, and feedback interacted to affect performance during the critical trial. When disappointing the audience was likely, subjects low in self-consciousness choked. Subjects high in self-consciousness tended to choke when they were told that their team had fallen behind. It is suggested that persons who are low and high in self-consciousness experience different types of performance pressure due to disparate self-presentational motives.     

Gender Differences in Perceptions of How Others Are Affected by Self-Disclosure of Achievement

Three experiments were conducted at two east coast Universities with primarily Caucasian students participating. In experiment one, college students disclosed that they scored in the 91st percentile or in the top half on an intelligence-related test to a female student who had scored either in the 42nd percentile (low-achieving) or the 92nd percentile (high-achieving) on the same test. Women who disclosed modestly (top half) judged that the low-achieving other felt better than women who disclosed immodestly (91st percentile). Also, women who disclosed modestly judged that the other liked them more than women who disclosed immodestly. These effects did not occur with men. In experiment two, college students disclosed that they scored in the 91st percentile or in the top half on an intelligence-related test to either a male or a female student who had scored in the 42nd percentile on the same test. Women who disclosed modestly judged that a female peer liked them more and felt more intelligent and confident than did women who disclosed immodestly. In contrast, men who disclosed immodestly judged that a female peer liked them more than did men who disclosed modestly. Regardless of the peer's gender, women judged that peers felt worse about themselves, were less happy and more upset when subjects had disclosed immodestly. In contrast, men judged that the peer felt better about himself or herself, was happier and less upset when the subjects had disclosed immodestly. In Experiment 3, male and female participants rated the intelligence-related test as equally difficult and rated doing well on them as equally important. Participants also indicated that doing well was equally important to males and females. Thus, ego-involvement is ruled out as an alternative explanation. These findings support the interpretation of previous research that women may choose to disclose modestly in an effort to be better liked or to protect the other's feelings.     

The Relationship Between Facial Contact With a Pillow and Mood

Three studies examined the relationship between facial contact with a pillow and mood. In the first, 414 undergraduates described their face and body positions when sleeping and upon awakening, and their moods upon awakening. Results indicated that more negative moods were associated with increased facial contact with pillows. Then, 2 experiments manipulated participants' face and body positions while they lay down and listened to affectively neutral prose passages and musical selections. Participants evaluated the passages and music. Results of both experiments showed that increased facial contact with a pillow led to more negative evaluations. It is argued that these findings reflect effects of facial contact on mood, and are consistent with the facial feedback hypothesis. Possible alternative explanations are considered.     

Ethical Considerations in Social Psychological Research: Is the Bogus Pipeline a Special Case?

The ethics of using deception in research are discussed, and Aguinis and Handelsman's (1997) arguments that research using the bogus pipeline (BPL), in particular, is unethical are reviewed and critiqued. Stances that view any deception research as unethical may be reasonable, and lead to the conclusion that BPL research is unethical. However, if the position taken is that deception research may be ethically acceptable, then there is no basis for concluding that BPL research is intrinsically unethical. The same considerations that are taken into account when deciding whether any deception in research is ethical apply to decisions about the ethical appropriateness of using the BPL.     

The “Championship Choke” Revisited: The Role of Fear of Acquiring a Negative Identity1

The contribution of fear of failing to paradoxical performance decrements under pressure (choking) before a supportive, home team audience was explored. A further analysis of archival baseball data presented by Baumeister and Steinhilber (1984) was undertaken. Home teams that took the lead, and for whom achieving a positive identity was therefore salient, and home teams that fell behind, and for whom fear of acquiring a negative identity was salient, choked in the decisive seventh game of the World Series. Choking was reflected by both a relative inability of the home team to maintain a lead or overcome a deficit in game 7 and by increases in the rate at which fielding errors were committed by home teams which had taken the lead or fallen behind in game 7. The findings are interpreted in light of recent research on self-attention and self-presentation.     

The IAT is sensitive to the perceived accuracy of newly learned associations

Three experiments tested whether the Implicit Association Test (IAT) is sensitive to the perceived accuracy of newly learned associations. In experiment 1, participants learned to associate positive or negative attributes with two novel groups. Participants in one condition were told that the attributes accurately described the groups; in a second condition, prior to learning, they were made aware that the attributes were randomly assigned to the groups. Participants were given an IAT and an explicit measure testing attitudes towards the two groups. When the participants were told that the attributes were accurate, their IAT performance and explicit measure responses indicated a preference for the more positively described group but when the attributes were known to be arbitrary, preferences were reduced according to both measures. Experiment 2 replicated these results and demonstrated that the associations were learned even in the random condition. Experiment 3 included a condition that placed “not” before each attribute, which demonstrated that people can incorporate a negative modifier into a learned association. Explicit attitudes and the IAT showed reversed preferences in this negation condition. These experiments imply that the IAT is sensitive to the perceived accuracy of learned associations. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of empathy and outcome on attribution: An examination of the divergent-perspectives hypothesis

Based on the theoretical ideas of Jones and Nisbett (Jones et al. Attribution: Perceiving the cause of behavior. New York: General Learning Press, 1971), and the recent findings of Regan and Totten (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 1975, 850–856), the present study assumed that from an attributional standpoint empathic observers and actors are functionally equivalent. On this basis it was predicted that empathic, relative to nonempathic, observers would make outcome attributions which have been typically found for actors themselves: They would attribute an actor's success to dispositional causes, but an actor's failure to situational causes. After instructions to empathize with the target, or to observe him, subjects watched a videotape of a target male attempting to make a good first impression on a female. Subjects later learned that the target had either succeeded or failed at making a good first impression, and were asked to make causal attributions for his outcome. As predicted, instructions to empathize led to dispositional attributions for success and situational attributions for failure, while standard observation instructions resulted in dispositional causal attributions regardless of outcome. The results were interpreted as supporting the contention that differential information processing may sufficiently account for the effects of outcome on causal attributions.     

The Relationship Between Political Preference and Judgments of President Clinton's Integrity Depends on Cognitive Complexity1

Participants who varied in cognitive complexity and political preference for President Clinton read a brief news account of an episode in which the President was said to have altered his behavior when he realized it was public. They then evaluated him. In 2 studies, participants low in cognitive complexity and positively disposed toward President Clinton rated his integrity as higher, whereas those negatively disposed gave him lower ratings. Participants higher in cognitive complexity, regardless of their political preference, made more moderate judgments of his integrity. This pattern was not observed for ratings of Clinton's sensitivity, social skillfulness, or work ethic. The role of cognitive complexity in integrating seemingly inconsistent behavior is discussed.