Resource theory and power in families: life cycle considerations

We begin our discussion by outlining the usefulness of "resource theory" as a theoretical framework for the study of family power. This framework is then used to analyze changes in the balance of power between elderly parents and their middle-age children. With respect to intergenerational power relationships, we argue that the autonomy of elderly parents has increased, but their power and influence over adult children has decreased. This trend is likely to continue in coming decades. Resource theory is then utilized to analyze changes in marital power relationships as couples age. Most studies of power relationships between elderly spouses have an important limitation--they tend to reflect yesterday's definitions of male and female roles. Recent changes in these roles may significantly alter the social meanings of aging for both men and women in coming years.     

REVIEW: Presocratic Philosophy

A discussion of W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. I, The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans (xv/538 pp.); Vol. 11, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus (xvii/553 pp.) Cambridge University Pres F. M. Cleve, The Giants of PreSophistic Greek Philosophy, An Attempt to Reconstruct Their Thoughts, Martinus Nijhoff D. E. Gershenson and D. A. Greenberg, Anaxagoras and the Birth of Physics, Blaisdell Publishing Company G. E. R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, Cambridge University Press, 1966 (v/503 pp.)     

Strong Boethius’ Thesis and Consequential Implication

The paper studies the relation between systems of modal logic and systems of consequential implication, a non-material form of implication satisfying Aristotle's Thesis (p does not imply not p ) and Weak Boethius' Thesis (if p implies q, then p does not imply not q ). Definitions are given of consequential implication in terms of modal operators and of modal operators in terms of consequential implication. The modal equivalent of Strong Boethius' Thesis (that p implies q implies that p does not imply not q) is identified.     

Inverses for Normal Modal Operators

Given a 1-ary sentence operator , we describe L - another 1-ary operator - as as a left inverse of in a given logic if in that logic every formula is provably equivalent to L. Similarly R is a right inverse of if is always provably equivalent to R. We investigate the behaviour of left and right inverses for taken as the operator of various normal modal logics, paying particular attention to the conditions under which these logics are conservatively extended by the addition of such inverses, as well as to the question of when, in such extensions, the inverses behave as normal modal operators in their own right.