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Kieran Setiya 《Philosophical Studies》2014,167(2):221-235
Argues for a conception of reasons as premises of practical reasoning. This conception is applied to questions about ignorance, advice, enabling conditions, “ought,” and evidence. 相似文献
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Kieran Setiya 《European Journal of Philosophy》2011,19(1):129-157
Abstract: This paper argues for a causal‐psychological account of acting for reasons. This view is distinguished from a more ambitious causal theory of action, clarified as far as possible, and motivated—against non‐reductive, teleological, and behaviourist alternatives—on broadly metaphysical grounds. 相似文献
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Kieran Setiya 《The Philosophical quarterly》1999,49(195):239-242
In the first part of Reasons and Persons , Derek Parfit argues that common-sense morality, or M , is self-defeating, so that it must be rejected or revised. I defend M . We can rebut Parfit's argument if we make an assumption about the moral importance of doing what is morally right. We need to assume that this end has sufficient weight in M . 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe argued that the moral vocabulary does not correspond to any concept in Aristotelian ethics, that it derives from a... 相似文献
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