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Authors Index
authors index 相似文献2.
Volume Contents
Contents of Volume 9 相似文献3.
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Jonathan Seglow 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2016,19(5):1103-1116
This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness. 相似文献
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The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back
too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that others’
interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with
the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding
values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding.
At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their
insistence that each person’s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second
half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in
a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Jonathan Seglow 《Journal of applied philosophy》2019,36(5):702-708
This response to Cecile Laborde's Liberalism's Religion explores her use of integrity in defence of legal accommodation for religious groups, noting some problems and issues raised by her account. It goes on to examine her novel category of Integrity Protecting Commitments, and then her views on reasonable disagreement. Integrity too, I suggest, may be the object of reasonable disagreement. Finally, it considers the two more general accounts of exemptions Laborde offers (into which the notion of integrity is inserted), disproportionate burden and majority bias. 相似文献
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