The effect of microlevel and macrolevel signaling on learning with 360° videos

The application of 360° videos raised the attention of educators and researchers, as it appears to be an approachable option to mediate complete environments in educational settings. However, challenges emerge from the perspective of educational psychology. Learning irrelevant cognitive strains might be imposed because it is necessary to navigate through spherical material. However, these potential downsides could be compensated for using signaling techniques. In a two (macrolevel vs. no macrolevel signaling) × two (microlevel vs. no microlevel signaling) factorial between-subjects design plus control group, 215 fifth-and sixth-grade students will watch a 360° video about visual and behavioral characteristics of animals. Learning outcomes, cognitive load, disorientation, and presence will be investigated. It is expected that macrolevel signaling will enhance learning and presence and reduce cognitive load and disorientation. Microlevel signaling will have comparable advantages, but these effects will be more pronounced when macrolevel signaling is implemented.     

Effects of differential interference with postnatal cerebellar neurogenesis on motor performance, activity level, and maze learning of rats: a developmental study

The region of the cerebellum was X-irradiated in infant rats with selected exposure schedules designed to produce animals in which the cerebellar cortex was (a) essentially normal except for agenesis of late forming granule cells with axons situated in the uppermost molecular layer (12--15X), (b) lacking in stellate cells, with a severe reduction in granule cells with axons in the upper molecular layer (8--15X), (c) morphologically disorganized but had only intermediate cell agenesis (4--5X), or (d) disorganized and devoid of practically all postnatally forming interneurons (4--15X). In the first two experiments young adults had to traverse rotating rods that differed in texture and types of obstacles. The 8--15X animals showed no deficits on any of the rods tested. The third study dealt with spontaneous motor performance in the open field at three ages. The 4--5X and 4--15X animals were hypoactive as infants and young adults; this was attributed to their motor deficits. The 8--15X and 12--15X animals were hyperactive in the open field as young adults. The fourth experiment examined intra- and/or intersession habituation. No group differences were found in habituation patterns. In the fifth experiment, using activity wheels, the 4--15X group was hypoactive, and the 8--15X and 12--15X groups were hyperactive as young adults. In the sixth experiment young adults were tested for learning performance in a multiple-unit water maze. The 4--15X group was deficient on single alternation; the 4--5X and 12--15X groups on double alternation. The seventh experiment shed some light on the single alternation deficit of the 4--15X group; only these animals failed to alternate spontaneously in a nonaversive situation. In conclusion, these behavioral results, combined with those of recent morphological investigations, suggest that the cerebellar cortex is hierarchically organized: The basal domain of Purkinje cells and the lower molecular layer are implicated in the coordination of movements; the apical domain of Purkinje cells and the upper molecular layer, in the coordination of actions.     

Helping is not enough: Recipient's reactions to aid as a function of positive and negative information about the self

The present research investigated the effects of experimentally induced positive and negative feedback about the self on the recipient's subsequent reactions to aid. In line with a consistency prediction, subjects given positive feedback who later received aid had lower mood ratings and less favorable self-evaluations than those who were given positive feedback but no subsequent help. Conversely, subjects given negative feedback who later received aid had higher mood ratings and more positive self-evaluations than those who were given negative feedback but no subsequent help. Subjects' evaluations of another individual were characterized by aid main effects, which indicate that an other who helped was evaluated more favorably than an other who did not help. The conceptual and applied implications of these results are discussed.     

Minimal mimicry: Mere effector matching induces preference

Both mimicking and being mimicked induces preference for a target. The present experiments investigate the minimal sufficient conditions for this mimicry-preference link to occur. We argue that mere effector matching between one’s own and the other person’s movement is sufficient to induce preference, independent of which movement is actually performed. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants moved either their arms or legs, and watched avatars that moved either their arms or legs, respectively, without any instructions to mimic. The executed movements themselves and their pace were completely different between participants (fast circular movements) and targets (slow linear movements). Participants preferred avatars that moved the same body part as they did over avatars that moved a different body part. In Experiment 3, using human targets and differently paced movements, movement similarity was manipulated in addition to effector overlap (moving forward–backward or sideways with arms or legs, respectively). Only effector matching, but not movement matching, influenced preference ratings. These findings suggest that mere effector overlap is sufficient to trigger preference by mimicry.     

Introspective disputes deflated: the case for phenomenal variation

Sceptics vis-à-vis introspection often base their scepticism on ‘phenomenological disputes’, ‘introspective disagreement’, or ‘introspective disputes’ (ID) (see Kriegel in Phenomenol CognSci 6(1):115–136, 2007; Bayne and Spener in Philos Issues 20(1):1–22, 2010; Schwitzgebel in Perplexities of consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2011): introspectors massively diverge in their opinions about experiences, and there seems to be no method to resolve these issues. Sceptics take this to show that introspection lacks any epistemic merit. Here, I provide a list of paradigmatic examples, distill necessary and sufficient conditions for IDs, present the sceptical argument encouraged by IDs, and review the two main strategies (resolution and containment) to reject such a scepticism. However, both types of strategies are unsatisfactory. In order to save introspection from the looming sceptical threat, I advocate a deflationary strategy, based on either an ‘Argument from Perceptual Kinship’ or an ‘Argument from Ownership’. In the end, there cannot be any genuine IDs, for nothing can fulfil the reasonable conditions for IDs. What looks like IDs may instead be indicators of phenomenal variation. Debates that look like IDs may then arise even if introspection were a perfect method to know one’s mind. Thus, scepticism vis-à-vis introspection based on IDs rests on shaky grounds.