排序方式: 共有12条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
1.
Carolina Sartorio 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):117-133
I argue that, according to ordinary morality, there is moral inertia, that is, moral pressure to fail to intervene in certain
circumstances. Moral inertia is manifested in scenarios with a particular causal structure: deflection scenarios, where a
threatening or benefiting process is diverted from a group of people to another. I explain why the deflection structure is
essential for moral inertia to be manifested. I argue that there are two different manifestations of moral inertia: strict
prohibitions on interventions, and constraints on interventions. Finally, I discuss the connection between moral inertia and
the distinction between killing and letting die (or doing and allowing harm).
相似文献
Carolina SartorioEmail: |
2.
3.
Carolina Sartorio 《The Journal of Ethics》2016,20(1-3):107-120
Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model (the “classical” approach to freedom, which understands freedom in terms of having access to alternative possibilities of action) and the actual-sequence model (the approach inspired by Harry G. Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities and the insights provided by the “Frankfurt-style” examples). This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for (or against) a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of Frankfurt-style cases also fail to undermine the actual-sequence model (in fact, they do that in a more glaring and indisputable way). My second strategy of defense consists in revitalizing the original motivation for the actual-sequence model, by revamping it, isolating it from claims that do not fully capture the same idea, and arguing that it can be developed in a successful way. 相似文献
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Philosophical Studies - The focus of this paper is an influential family of views in the ethics of self-defense and war: views that ground the agent’s liability to be attacked in self-defense... 相似文献
9.
10.
Carolina Sartorio 《Journal of applied philosophy》2020,37(3):346-363
Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. 相似文献