Assessing potential reinforcement-like effects of brief stimuli unrelated to food reinforcers

It is widely assumed that reinforcers are biologically relevant stimuli, or stimuli that have been associated with biologically relevant stimuli. However, brief, arbitrary stimuli have also been reported to have reinforcement-like effects, despite being unrelated to biologically relevant stimuli like food. The present study explored the potential reinforcement-like effects of brief stimuli across 5 experiments. In Experiments 1 through 4, pigeon subjects responded for food reinforcement and brief stimulus presentations in a 2-component multiple schedule. Neither baseline response rates nor resistance to change during disruption tests were systematically greater in a component with versus without brief stimulus presentations. Increasing the rate and duration of brief stimulus presentations in Experiment 4 did not reveal reinforcement-like effects when compared directly with food. In Experiment 5, pigeons chose between independent terminal links in a concurrent-chains procedure. Across conditions, varying the location, duration, and rate of brief stimulus presentations in the terminal links had no systematic effects on preference. In contrast, varying rates of food reinforcers resulted in large and reliable shifts in preference. Therefore, the present study found no systematic evidence that brief stimuli unrelated to food reliably increase response rates, resistance to change, or preference. These data demonstrate the value of systematic replication, and a behavioral momentum approach to assessing potential reinforcement-like effects.     

Audience Design in Multiparty Conversation

How do speakers design what they say in order to communicate effectively with groups of addressees who vary in their background knowledge of the topic at hand? Prior findings indicate that when a speaker addresses a pair of listeners with discrepant knowledge, that speakers Aim Low, designing their utterances for the least knowledgeable of the two addressees. Here, we test the hypothesis that speakers will depart from an Aim Low approach in order to efficiently communicate with larger groups of interacting partners. Further, we ask whether the cognitive demands of tracking multiple conversational partners' perspectives places limitations on successful audience design. We find that speakers can successfully track information about what up to four of their partners do and do not know in conversation. When addressing groups of 3–4 addressees at once, speakers design language based on the combined knowledge of the group. These findings point to an audience design process that simultaneously represents the perspectives of multiple other individuals and combines these representations in order to design utterances that strike a balance between the different needs of the individuals within the group.     

CHILD-REARING BELIEFS WITHIN DIVERSE SOCIAL STRUCTURES: MOTHERS AND DAY-CARE PROVIDERS IN MEXICO*

The child-rearing beliefs of 32 mothers and 36 day-care providers in Mexico were compared. Day-care providers expected children to master developmental skills at an earlier age than did mothers. Day-care providers more strongly valued the development of independent and cooperative behavior, and placed less importance on obedience. They also reported employing more flexible and nonauthoritarian discipline strategies than did mothers. Mothers and caregivers did not differ in the extent to which they attributed the success of their discipline strategies to their own actions rather than to external factors. Also examined was how mothers' beliefs differed in families characterized by interdependent versus individualistic social structures. In interdependent families, mothers were more likely to believe in later mastery of developmental skills and to make external attributions. These findings suggest that Mexican children experience incongruous social norms as they move between home and day care settings, and that these norms, at least within the home, are associated with the social structural features of the setting.     

The Multilevel Conception of Intentionality: Implications for counselor training

Counseling training programs have failed to differentiate between and among behavioral, cognitive, and unconsciousness dimesnsions. This omission has resulted in confusion and competition in many counseling curricula in that valuable programs are competing for space rather than being integrated systematically. This article proposes a multilevel model of intentionality which integrates the several aspects of the counselor-client relationship. In turn, this integration of behavioral, cognitive, and unconscious dimensions will have important applications in counselor daily practice.     

Vocal frequency and person perception: Effects of perceptual salience and nonverbal sensitivity

Previous research has demonstrated that changes in vocal frequency (pitch) influence judgments made about a speaker, although there is some question as to the relative importance of frequency to message content in person perception. Moreover, these studies have failed to examine the possible joint effect of frequency and individual differences in nonverbal sensitivity on person perception. The purpose of the present investigation was to examine the independent and joint effects of vocal frequency, perceptual salience, and nonverbal sensitivity (assessed by the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity) on person perception. Participants were assigned to one of nine experimental conditions and were asked to rate two male and two female speakers on seven unipolar adjective scales. The nine conditions were produced by factorially combining three levels each of salience (content, voice, control) and vocal frequency (decreased, increased, unmanipulated). The results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses indicated that variations in frequency did influence evaluative judgments of the speakers (competent, honest, persuasive), but that the magnitude of the influence varied as a function of the participants' levels of nonverbal sensitivity. The analyses, however, yielded no significant effects for participants' affective judgments, nor any significant effects involving perceptual salience.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.