Ingroup ambivalence and experienced discomfort: the moderating roles of affective versus cognitive attitudinal basis, group identification, as mediated by negative beliefs about the ingroup

Prior research has found individuals' reactions to vary depending on whether such associations are activated by emotions (an affective basis) or by beliefs (a cognitive basis) about the object's properties. Accordingly, this conceptual distinction should be relevant also for the discomfortive responses to one's ambivalent attitudes regarding fellow group members (or the ingroup). Findings from two studies support the argument that ambivalence-associated discomfort a) is a general tendency when it regards affect-based ambivalence towards fellow group members, while b) only holds for the more identified group members when ambivalence concerns beliefs about the ingroup, and for this latter group members c) this tendency is driven by the strength of their negative beliefs about the ingroup or fellow group members.     

Sick? Or slow? On the origins of intelligence as a psychological object

This paper examines the first moments of the emergence of “psychometrics” as a discipline, using a history of the Binet–Simon test (precursor to the Stanford–Binet) to engage the question of how intelligence became a “psychological object.” To begin to answer this, we used a previously-unexamined set of French texts to highlight the negotiations and collaborations that led Alfred Binet (1857–1911) to identify “mental testing” as a research area worth pursuing. This included a long-standing rivalry with Désiré-Magloire Bourneville (1840–1909), who argued for decades that psychiatrists ought to be the professional arbiters of which children would be removed from the standard curriculum and referred to special education classes in asylums. In contrast, Binet sought to keep children in schools and conceived of a way for psychologists to do this. Supported by the Société libre de l'étude psychologique de l'enfant [Free society for the psychological study of the child], and by a number of collaborators and friends, he thus undertook to create a “metric” scale of intelligence—and the associated testing apparatus—to legitimize the role of psychologists in a to-that-point psychiatric domain: identifying and treating “the abnormal”. The result was a change in the earlier law requiring all healthy French children to attend school, between the ages of 6 and 13, to recognize instead that otherwise normal children sometimes need special help: they are “slow” (arriéré), but not “sick.” This conceptualization of intelligence was then carried forward, through the test's influence on Lewis Terman (1877–1956) and Lightner Witmer (1867–1956), to shape virtually all subsequent thinking about intelligence testing and its role in society.     

Ducking the collection of costly evidence: Motivated use of statistical heuristics

We examined whether motivation affects people's use of statistical heuristics. In two studies, subjects had to decide how many instances to observe before making predictions. Half the subjects were led to believe that the observation of each instance would be relatively high in cost, and half were led to believe that it would be relatively low in cost. In both studies, only subjects for whom evidence collection was relatively high in cost accessed the aggregation principle and came to believe that aggregates afforded greater predictability than did single instances. Their belief that predictability increases sharply with sample size may have allowed these subjects to conclude what they wanted to conclude, namely that smaller samples would suffice for their predictions.     

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

Motivational influence on the quality of memories: recall of general autobiographical memories related to desired attributes

This article concerns recall of general autobiographical memories in motivated self‐perception. General memories, comprising abstraction of repeated or similar behaviours, have more impact on how one defines oneself than do specific memories. In a study, participants were first induced to believe that either extraversion or introversion leads to success. In the recall task that followed, introversion‐success participants recalled more general memories related to introversion than did extraversion‐success participants. In contrast, extraversion‐success participants recalled more general extraverted memories than did introversion‐success participants. Thus, to preserve a positive self‐image as characterized by desirable attributes, recall may be directed towards generation of general memories related to the attributes. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In search of information that confirms a desired self-perception: motivated processing of social feedback and choice of social interactions

The present studies examined how the motivation to see oneself as characterized by desirable attributes may influence feedback seeking and social preferences. In Study 1, participants were first led to believe that extraversion or introversion is conducive of success. Next, they received false feedback about themselves, related to extraversion and to introversion. In a surprise recall, extraversion-success participants remembered extraversion feedback more accurately and introversion feedback less, compared to introversion-success participants. Study 2 examined preferences for others as potential sources of feedback. The findings revealed that extraversion-success participants preferred others who perceived them as extraverted, whereas introversion-success participants preferred others who perceived them as introverted. Thus, people appear to rely on how others regard them to realize a desired self-perception. These processes, oriented more toward social and interpersonal aspects of the self, complement the more intrapersonal processes of motivated self-perception studied in the past.     

Motivated recruitment of autobiographical memories

We hypothesized that people motivated to believe that they possess a given trait search for autobiographical memories that reflect that trait, so as to justify their desired self-view. We led subjects to believe that either extraversion or introversion was desirable, and obtained convergent evidence from open-ended memory-listing tasks as well as from reaction-time tasks measuring the speed with which memories could be generated that this manipulation enhanced the accessibility of memories reflecting the desired trait. If people rely on their memories to construct desired self-concepts, motivated changes in self-concepts should be constrained by the content of available memories. Our final study demonstrates such constraints.     

Motivated self and recall: visual perspectives in remembering past behaviors

The present study examined motivational influences on visual perspectives in remembering past events and behaviors. Participants were first induced to believe that extraversion or introversion is conducive of success. Next, they recalled in details two introverted past behaviors. Introversion‐success participants, presumably motivated to see themselves as introverted, recalled and visualized the behaviors more from a first‐person actor perspective than did extraversion‐success participants (who recalled the behaviors from a third‐person observer perspective). Remembering past behaviors from a first‐person actor perspective implies that the behaviors are true of the self and impacts self‐definition to a relatively greater degree. The findings thus extend the influence of desired self to how people remember past events. They also contribute to the integration of motives in research on the link between self‐inferences and the subjective experience of remembering. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavioural consequences of motivated self-concept change

The present study examines how motivated self-concept changes are reflected in actual behaviour. Subjects were led to believe that either extroversion or introversion was related to success. Their preferences for others as interaction partners were then examined. The findings suggest that people seek others who confirmed the belief that they possessed the success-related attribute. Self-verification, as a possible strategy to confirm a desired self, was partially supported. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.