Acceptance, inference, and the multiple-conclusion sequent

This paper offers an interpretation of multiple-conclusion sequents as a kind of meta-inference rule: just as single-conclusion sequents represent inferences from sentences to sentences, so multiple-conclusion sequents represent a certain kind of inference from single-conclusion sequents to single-conclusion sequents. The semantics renders sound and complete the standard structural rules of reflexivity, monotonicity (or thinning), and transitivity (or cut). The paper is not the first one to attempt to account for multiple-conclusion sequents without invoking notions of truth or falsity??but unlike earlier such efforts, which have typically helped themselves to primitive notions of both acceptance and rejection, the present one makes do with the former alone. For technical reasons, the treatment is limited to sequents with non-empty succedents.     

Circularities in the Analysis of Counterfactuals

Expanding on a discussion by Hansson, this paper treats of Goodman's and Lewis' accounts of counterfactual conditionals, comparing the senses in which these theories may be accused of circularity. While I do maintain that in this respect Lewis has an edge over Goodman, the paper's aim is not so much to reach a firm conclusion as to disentangle some previously conflated aspects of the issue. It is also suggested that the importance of avoiding circularity may vary depending on the philosophical purpose of one's analysis. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Learning while typing

Subjects representing two different levels of skill in typewriting participated in an experiment concerning higher mental activities in connection with typewriting. Understanding and learning of the text typed was facilitated simply by the instruction: “Think of what you are typing!”. The improvement in learning was accompanied neither by increase in time nor in mean number of errors.