Social embeddedness and economic opportunism: a game situation

According to Evolutionary Game Theory, multiple exchanges with partners are necessary to foster cooperation. Multiple exchanges with partners tend to enhance the good experience of the partners and the predictability of their behaviour and should therefore increase cooperativeness. This study explored whether social embeddedness, or the preference for close and stable social relationships, a variable which tends to increase multiple exchanges, is associated with more cooperative attitudes; and whether social embeddedness increases cooperative behavior towards unknown partners in a game situation. The first study, with 169 undergraduates, indicated that social embeddedness (preference for close and durable social relations) was negatively associated with opportunistic attitudes. The second study had a sample of 60 undergraduates playing a Trust Game with unknown partners and showed that self-reported social embeddedness was positively correlated with scores for cooperative economic behavior towards the partners. These results highlight the relationships of social embeddedness with cooperative attitudes and behaviour.     

Association of Economic Internality With Saving Behavior and Motives,Financial Confidence,and Attitudes Toward State Intervention1

This study investigates economic locus of control (ELOC) in a Greek sample using Furnham's (1986) scale. In particular, it examines the association between ELOC and saving behavior and motives, attitudes toward state intervention in the economic field, and factors engendering confidence in economic matters. The main hypotheses predicted that internal ELOC should be associated with (a) desire for less state intervention; (b) confidence in factors under one's own control (knowing the other party in transactions, being well informed) more strongly than with other factors of economic trust, such as the state and the law; (c) more saving; and (d) that respondents with internal and external ELOC should be differentiated with respect to saving motives. Analysis was based on a sample of 135 participants from Athens. Principal components analysis of the Greek translation of Furnham's ELOC questionnaire gave results similar to those reported from England, yielding 4 factors interpretable as chance, internal, external/denial, and powerful others. The findings of the study include confirmation of all of the hypotheses.     

Is a Manipulator's Externality Paradoxical? The Relationship Between Machiavellianism,Economic Opportunism,and Economic Locus of Control

Machiavellianism and economic opportunism are defecting strategies founded on manipulating information in order to maximize gain or power. This study investigated their relationship with economic internality. We hypothesized that individuals inclined to adopt defecting strategies would tend to have external economic locus of control (ELOC). A Greek sample of 175 participants completed the ELOC and Mach IV questionnaires and a scale of economic opportunism. Machiavellianism and opportunism were both positively correlated with the ELOC Chance factor. Opportunism was negatively correlated with the ELOC Internal factor. The findings confirmed the hypothesis and showed that this kind of defector overestimates the role of chance, uncertainty, and hazard as sources of economic reinforcements.     

Opportunistic propensity hinders commitment to acts in conditions of forced compliance and compliance without pressure

The psychosocial literature contains empirical evidence of the effects of personality variables on commitment to acts. The association of economic opportunism was explored with respect to postexperimental attitude change, intentions, and intrinsic motivation of individuals (N=132) toward acts with either forced compliance or compliance without pressure. In conditions of commitment and compliance without pressure, both intention and intrinsic motivation decreased as economic opportunism increased, while in conditions of commitment and forced compliance, intention increased as economic opportunism increased. Attitude change and economic opportunism did not appear to be associated in any experimental condition. These findings suggest that tendency to noncooperativeness predisposes to reduced concern for consistency and compliance with performed acts.     

Machiavellianism and Economic Opportunism

This study explores the relationship between 2 defecting strategies based on the manipulation of information; namely, Machiavellianism and economic opportunism. There are 3 main hypotheses that were confirmed in questionnaire investigations among samples of 191 and 113 university students in Athens. Machiavellianism was positively correlated with economic opportunism, shown by a statistically highly significant positive correlation between scores on scales measuring these 2 concepts. In situations of asymmetric information where they held the advantage, high Machs adopted more opportunistic strategies, showing the greatest inclination to maximize their own profit. High Machs showed less trust in potential economic partners, whom they regarded as untrustworthy maximizers.