RESPONSE‐DEPENDENCE ABOUT AESTHETIC VALUE

The dominant view about the nature of aesthetic value holds it to be response‐dependent. We believe that the dominance of this view owes largely to some combination of the following prevalent beliefs:

• 1 The belief that challenges brought against response‐dependent accounts in other areas of philosophy are less challenging when applied to response‐dependent accounts of aesthetic value.
• 2 The belief that aesthetic value is instrumental and that response‐dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates this purported fact.
• 3 The belief that response‐dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates the widely acknowledged anthropocentricity of aesthetic value.
• 4 The belief that response‐dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates aesthetic normativity.

We argue that each of these beliefs is false, and that the dominance of response‐dependent accounts of aesthetic value is therefore largely without foundation.     

Personal Responsibility for Tornado Preparedness: Commitment or Choice?1

A review of the literature reveals that personal responsibility assumed for one's behavior clearly affects behavioral outcomes for a variety of situations, and that personal responsibility is in turn affected by a wide variety of variables. However, limited research has been conducted to determine exactly what personal responsibility fundamentally entails. While duty, moral obligation, choice, and commitment have been suggested as being integral to the concept of responsibility, few investigations have systematically varied more than one of these variables in a single experiment. The present study was conducted to investigate the effects of both choice and commitment on personal responsibility assumed for and behavioral intentions to engage in tornado preparedness. Results indicate that both choice and commitment were required to generate personal responsibility for and subsequent intentions to engage in tornado preparedness. Implications of these results are discussed.     

The Moderating Effects of Cognitive Appraisal Processes on Self-Attribution of Responsibility

Research indicates that self-attribution of responsibility for various types of problems is affected by a number of variables, including number of bystanders, persuasive communications, and focus of attention. The present study was designed to test the hypothesis that attributions of responsibility are also influenced by cognitive appraisal of sufficiency of resources relative to the magnitude of the problem in question. When circumstances indicate that self is the most plausible locus of responsibility, attribution to self will occur only if the person also assesses his or her resources as being sufficient to fulfill the obligations implied upon locating responsibility for problem solution in self. The converse is also held to be true. Results confirmed this hypothesis. Implications of this theoretical approach for various theories that include attribution of responsibility to self as a critical factor are discussed.     

PROBLEMS OF INTERNALIZATION: A BUTTON IS A BUTTON IS—NOT

Analysts hope to help the patient internalize a relationship with the analyst that contrasts with the original archaic object relation. In this paper, the author describes particular difficulties in working with a patient whose defenses and anxieties were bulimic, her movement toward internalization inevitably undone. Several issues are considered: how does the nonsymbolizing patient come to internalize the analyst's understanding, and when this does not hold, what is the nature of the patient's subsequent methods of dispersal? When the patient can maintain connection to the analyst as a good object, even fleetingly, in the depressive position, the possibility of internalization and symbolic communication is increased.     

An interdependence analysis of commuting decisions

The current research advances an interdependence analysis of commuting decisions (i.e. commuting by car versus public transportation), delineating the determinants of an individual's outcomes in terms of own decisions, other commuters' decisions, and the combination or interaction of own and others' decisions (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Consistent with hypotheses, findings revealed that a concern with comfort led to a higher overall personal preference for the car, and a lower overall preference for others to commute by public transportation, when compared to a concern with travel time. Additionally, consistent with the claim that commuter decisions are also guided by considerations broader than a concern with individual outcomes, findings revealed that individuals with prosocial orientations (i.e. those concerned with maximizing collective outcomes) in combination with high levels of trust (i.e. believing in the honesty and cooperative intentions of others) exhibited a greater overall personal preference for public transportation, and a reduced desire to avoid other commuters, relative to individuals with a prosocial orientation and low levels of trust, or a proself orientation (i.e. those concerned primarily with maximizing own outcomes), regardless of levels of trust. Finally, consistent with the current interdependence analysis, intention to commute by car was positively associated with not only overall personal preference for the car, but also with the desire to avoid other commuters. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Biopower,Styles of Reasoning,and What's Still Missing from the Stem Cell Debates

Until now, philosophical debate about human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has largely been limited to its ethical dimensions and implications. Although the importance and urgency of these ethical debates should not be underestimated, the almost undivided attention that mainstream and feminist philosophers have paid to the ethical dimensions of hESC research suggests that the only philosophically interesting questions and concerns about it are by and large ethical in nature. My argument goes some distance to challenge the assumption that ethical considerations alone must be foregrounded in philosophical discussions about hESC research by introducing a critical stance on the epistemological and ontological assumptions that underlie and condition it. A central aim of the paper is to show how Foucault's insights into knowledge‐power, taken in combination with Hacking's claims about styles of reasoning, can make these assumptions evident, as well as cast light on their potentially deleterious implications for disabled people. Arguing in this way also enables me to draw out constitutive effects of research on stem cells, that is, to indicate how the discursive practices surrounding research on stem cells, as well as the technology itself, contribute to the constitution of impairment.     

False Memory Syndrome: A Feminist Philosophical Approach

In this essay, I attempt to outline a feminist philosophical approach to the current debate concerning (allegedly) false memories of childhood sexual abuse. Bringing the voices of feminist philosophers to bear on this issue highlights the implicit and sometimes questionable epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical-political commitments of some therapists and scientists involved in these debates. It also illuminates some current debates in and about feminist philosophy.     

Depression and Problem-Solving Performance on a Fault-Diagnosis Task

Dysphoric and control undergraduates selected on the basis of Beck Depression Inventory scores were compared on a problem-solving task involving fault-diagnosis. The stimuli were wiring diagrams showing boxes or units connected to indicators, and the aim was to diagnose which one of the units was faulty. Dysphoric subjects did not differ from controls on problems requiring them to use the information available at the outset of the problem to identify all the potentially faulty units. They were impaired relative to controls in testing connections that they believed to be potentially faulty until the faulty unit was diagnosed; they made more repetition errors, carried out more redundant tests, and were slower than controls, although the groups did not differ in the number of correct solutions achieved. The findings are discussed in terms of theoretical models that posit impaired strategic processing in depression.