Multipotentiality,Giftedness, and Career Choice: A Review

The giftedness and career-choice literatures have traditionally spoken in different terms about the same phenomenon, multipotentiality. Multipotentialed individuals have numerous and diverse abilities and interests. Appropriate interventions are necessary to help them cope successfully with the abundance of career choices available to them. This review links the giftedness and career-choice literatures through a discussion of the concept of multipotentiality and explores ensuing practical implications and challenges to the overall idea.     

Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd

Recently, Dylan Dodd (this Journal) has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs)??i.e., utterances of the form ??S knows that p, but it??s possible that q?? (where q entails not-p) (Rysiew, Noûs 35(4): 477?C514, 2001). Here, we respond to the criticisms Dodd offers of the account of the semantics and the sometime-infelicity of CKAs we have given (Dougherty and Rysiew, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 121?C132, 2009), showing both how Dodd misunderstands certain central features of that view and how the latter can, pace Dodd, be naturally extended to explain the oddity of those ??For all I know?? statements to which Dodd draws attention.     

Testimony,simulation, and the limits of inductivism

Although theorists disagree about precisely how to characterize the link between anger and moral judgment, that they are linked is routinely taken for granted in contemporary metaethics and philosophy of emotion. One problem with this assumption is that it ignores virtues like patience, which thinkers as different as Cassian, ?āntideva, and Maimonides have argued are characteristic of mature moral agents. The patient neither experience nor plan to experience anger in response to (at least some) wrongs. Nevertheless, we argue, they remain capable of judging such actions to be wrong. This indicates that a different account of the relationship between anger and moral judgment is required. We conclude by proposing one such account, showing how a metaethicist who was more attentive to the normative ethics of anger might set about reconstructing her position.     

A study in the cognition of individuals' identity: solving the problem of singular cognition in object and agent tracking

This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the relation between object- and agent-tracking are distinguished: the Independence, Deflationary and Organism-Dependence Views. The correct view is argued to be the latter, which states that perceptual and epistemic tracking of a unique human organism requires tracking both its spatio-temporal object-properties and its agent-properties.