Sustained attention in children at risk for schizophrenia: Findings with two visual continuous performance tests in a new sample

In partial replication of an earlier study, 35 children at high risk for schizophrenia, 25 children at high risk for affective disorder, and 53 normal control children from a new sample of 7- to 12-year-old subjects were tested with two new visual continuous performance tests. Response levels and intrasubject variability were analyzed separately. Multivariate analyses on factor scores derived from response levels indicate that "groups" is a significant predictor for a factor reflecting discriminability (or sensitivity) for the more difficult of these tests but not for the less difficult one, and that high risk for schizophrenia is associated with lower performance. Factor scores and multiple regression analyses were used to dichotomize subjects as to whether or not they are low performance outliers. A significantly larger proportion of subjects from the high risk for schizophrenia group than from the control groups were low performance outliers. Among subjects that developed psychopathology in adolescence, subjects at high risk for schizophrenia were more likely to have contributed low performance outliers early during childhood.     

No need for an intention to deceive? Challenging the traditional definition of lying

According to the traditional definition of lying, somebody lies if he or she makes a believed-false statement with the intention to deceive. The traditional definition has recently been challenged by non-deceptionists who use bald-faced lies to underpin their view that the intention to deceive is no necessary condition for lying. We conducted two experiments to test whether their assertions are true. First, we presented one of five scenarios that consisted of three different kinds of lies (consistent bald-faced lies, conflicting bald-faced lies, and indifferent lies). Then we asked participants to judge whether the scenario at hand was a lie, whether the speaker intended to deceive somebody, and how they would judge the behavior in terms of morality. As expected, our results indicate that the intention to deceive is not a necessary condition for lying. Participants rated indifferent lies to be lies and judged that no intention to deceive was involved in these cases. In addition, all bald-faced lies were evaluated as lies. However, participants widely ascribed an intention to deceive to bald-faced lies, which thus might not apply as counterexamples against the traditional definition of lying. Besides, lies are judged as morally wrong regardless of an intention to deceive.     

Empirically Investigating the Concept of Lying

Lying is an everyday moral phenomenon about which philosophers have written a lot. Not only the moral status of lying has been intensively discussed but also what it means to lie in the first place. Perhaps the most important criterion for an adequate definition of lying is that it fits with people’s understanding and use of this concept. In this light, it comes as a surprise that researchers only recently started to empirically investigate the folk concept of lying. In this paper, we describe three experimental studies which address the following questions: Does a statement need to be objectively false in order to constitute lying? Does lying necessarily include the intention to deceive? Can one lie by omitting relevant facts?