Is I Guaranteed to Refer?

Abstract: One claim about I , regularly made and almost universally endorsed, is that uses of the term are logically guaranteed to refer successfully (if they refer at all). The claim is only rarely formulated perspicuously or argued for. Such obscurity helps disguise the fact that those who profess to advance the claim actually turn out to support not a logical guarantee at all but merely high security through fortunate coincidence. This is not surprising. For we have no good reason to accept the claim – granted, any use of I is apt to refer successfully; but that can be explained by pragmatic features of its use. And we have some reason to reject the claim – it is notoriously difficult to see how genuine reference and guaranteed success do not exclude each other when considered as properties of the logic of any term.     

Training Observers to Detect Deception Effects of Self-Monitoring and Rehearsal

It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses.     

The effects of contextual information and gender on the prediction of hypnotic susceptibility

Council, Kirsch, and Hafner (1986) obtained empirical support for the hypothesis that significant correlations between questionnaire measures of absorption and hypnotic susceptibility are an artifact of subjects' beliefs about their own hypnotizability. We tested this hypothesis in a two-session experiment. During Session 1, subjects completed questionnaire measures of absorption, mystical experience, daydreaming frequency, and paranormal beliefs. During Session 2, subjects were tested for hypnotic susceptibility. Subjects were also exposed to one of three information manipulations: They were told about hypnotic testing either before or after filling out the questionnaires or were not told about hypnotic testing. The information manipulation moderated the prediction of susceptibility by the questionnaire measures for women, but not for men. For women, scores on the absorption questionnaire predicted susceptibility only when subjects were informed about hypnotic testing. In the told-after condition, this effect generalized to all of the remaining questionnaire measures. For men, none of the questionnaires was a reliable predictor of susceptibility.     

RELIABILITY AND FACTORIAL VALIDITY OF THE JUNIOR EYSENCK PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE IN ZIMBABWE

Six-hundred and thirteen girls and 601 boys in Zimbabwe completed the Junior Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (JEPQ). The reliability of the Neuroticism (N) and Social Desirability (L) factors was acceptable but the Psychoticism (P) and Extraversion (E) factors possessed modest reliability. While the factorial validity of the P, N and L scales was acceptable, the factorial validity of the E scale was poor. L scores were significantly correlated with N and P scores among girls and boys. Whereas Zimbabwean girls reported higher P scores than did Canadian girls, Zimbabwean boys reported lower P scores than did Canadian boys. Zimbabwean girls and boys reported lower E and N and higher P scores than their Canadian counterparts. This study provides broad support for Eysenck's basic personality model, but it does not support the use of this version of the JEPQ, and especially the E scale, among Zimbabwean children.     

Moral Judgment in Extreme Social Contexts: Soldiers Who Refuse to Fight and Physicians Who Strike?1

This paper compares two examples of moral action within extreme social contexts: the refusal of Israeli reserve soldiers to perform their military service during the war in Lebanon (1982–1983), and the refusal of Israeli physicians to provide medical care during a “labor war”, that is a strike. This paper examines the cognitive developmental premise that with an increase in the actors' stage of moral development there will be a greater consistency between hypothetical and actual moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1984). Blasi's (1983) concept of personal integrity, that is, the consistency between the actors' judgment concerning the morality of an action and the action that was actually performed, is examined as well. The findings show that the “refusing” soldiers manifested stage consistency in their action, whereas the physicians failed to justify their action in line with their moral competence. Whereas the soldiers viewed their action as highly moral, the physicians viewed their strike action as unfortunate but necessary. The motivation of the two groups of actors to act in line with their behavioral choices is discussed.