Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences

Kim’s model of ‘functional reduction’ of properties is shown to fail in a class of cases from physics involving properties at different spatial levels. The diagnosis of this failure leads to a non-reductive account of the relation of micro and macro properties.     

Perspectival Realism and Incompatible Models

I discuss the prospects of perspectival realism for resolving the problem of incompatible models or theories in scientific practice. My diagnosis is that the perspectivist can secure the ‘realism’ in her position only by employing suitable relations between the models. It is such relations that do the work, not the general philosophical claim about the perspectival nature of knowledge claims. But appeal to such relations has also been the preferred strategy of scientific realist approaches to the problem. With respect to the problem of incompatible models, then, it is not clear that perspectivism has a clear advantage—even though the issue was among the motivating problems for proposing this view. I suggest, however, that the required inter-model relations (typically limit relations) embody a narrower notion of perspective, a notion that is explicitly part of the models themselves and that is essential in maintaining a realist view.     

Connection and Influence: A Process Theory of Causation

Summary  A combination of process and counterfactual theories of causation is proposed with the aim of preserving the strengths of each of the approaches while avoiding their shortcomings. The basis for the combination, or hybrid, view is the need, common to both accounts, of imposing a stability requirement on the causal relation.     

Risk and diversification in theory choice

How can it be rational to work on a new theory that does not yet meet the standards for good or acceptable theories? If diversity of approaches is a condition for scientific progress, how can a scientific community achieve such progress when each member does what it is rational to do, namely work on the best theory? These two methodological problems, the problem of pursuit and the problem of diversity, can be solved by taking into account the cognitive risk that is involved in theory choice. I compare this solution to other proposals, in particular T. S. Kuhn's and P. Kitcher's view that the two problems demonstrate the epistemic significance of the scientific community.     

Stability of peer victimization in early adolescence: effects of timing and duration

The current study investigated the stability of peer victimization and the impact of the timing and duration of victimization on psychological and academic outcomes for boys and girls on a sample of 863 middle school students. Results demonstrated strong support for the onset hypothesis and concurrent effects of maladjustment in anxiety, depression, self-esteem, poor school attitude, GPA, and attendance. Support for the cessation hypothesis was mixed, depending on the outcome and gender: boys demonstrated recovery from internalizing distress, whereas girls demonstrated residual effects, even after the cessation of victimization. Girls also demonstrated residual effects of victimization on grades, and both boys and girls evidenced residual effects of victimization on attendance. Regarding duration of victimization, there was strong support for the life-events model of stress and coping across almost all outcomes, suggesting that even temporary experiences of victimization could have a negative impact on psychological and academic outcomes. Overall, results demonstrated the importance of considering the timing and duration of victimization in understanding the risks and damaging effects of victimization. The results from this study also highlight both the need and the potential to intervene during early adolescence when peer relationships are taking on increasing importance, as well as the importance of helping students regain social-emotional and academic functioning, even after victimization ceases.     

Hierarchies and levels of reality

We examine some assumptions about the nature of ‘levels of reality’ in the light of examples drawn from physics. Three central assumptions of the standard view of such levels (for instance, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958) are (i) that levels are populated by entities of varying complexity, (ii) that there is a unique hierarchy of levels, ranging from the very small to the very large, and (iii) that the inhabitants of adjacent levels are related by the parthood relation. Using examples from physics, we argue that it is more natural to view the inhabitants of levels as the behaviors of entities, rather than entities themselves. This suggests an account of reduction between levels, according to which one behavior reduces to another if the two are related by an appropriate limit relation. By considering cases where such inter-level reduction fails, we show that the hierarchy of behaviors differs in several respects from the standard hierarchy of entities. In particular, while on the standard view, lower-level entities are ‘micro’ parts of higher-level entities, on our view, a system’s macro-level behavior can be seen as a (‘non-spatial’) part of its micro-level behavior. We argue that this second hierarchy is not really in conflict with the standard view and that it better suits examples of explanation in science.     

Idealized and perspectival representations: some reasons for making a distinction

I argue that an adequate understanding of the practice of constructing models in physics requires a distinction between two strategies that are commonly both labeled ‘idealization’. The formal characteristic of both methods is to let a parameter in the equations for a target system go to zero. But the discussion of examples from various applications of perturbation theory shows that there is in general a difference with respect to the aims such limiting procedures are supposed to serve; and with different aims comes the need to characterize the means (the interpretation of the limits) differently. I therefore suggest that we distinguish ‘idealizations’ from ‘perspectives’ or perspectival representations.     

Local Theories of Causation and the a Posteriori Identification of the Causal Relation

The need to find an intrinsic characterization of what makes a relation between events causal arises not only in local theories of causation like Salmon's process theory but also in global approaches like Lewis' counterfactual theory. According to the localist intuition, whether a process connecting two events is causal should depend only on what goes on between the events, not on conditions that hold elsewhere in the world. If such intrinsic characterizations could be found, an identification of the causal relation in the actual world (though not in other possible worlds) with physical processes may be feasible (the a posteriori identification). I consider recent proposals made for intrinsic characterizations of causality and conclude that none of them is able to deliver the intended result.