Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility

Recent developments in neuroscience raise the worry that understanding how brains cause behavior will undermine our views about free will and, consequently, about moral responsibility. The potential ethical consequences of such a result are sweeping. I provide three reasons to think that these worries seemingly inspired by neuroscience are misplaced. First, problems for common-sense notions of freedom exist independently of neuroscientific advances. Second, neuroscience is not in a position to undermine our intuitive notions. Third, recent empirical studies suggest that even if people do misconstrue neuroscientific results as relevant to our notion of freedom, our judgments of moral responsibility will remain largely unaffected. These considerations suggest that neuroethical concerns about challenges to our conception of freedom are misguided.     

“Local determination”, even if we could find it,does not challenge free will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn

Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threaten “libertarian free will” (free will that requires indeterminism), he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend that “local determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertarians—that is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood.     

Improving adherence to physical activity

Two studies tested the efficacy of Marlatt and Gordon's relapse-prevention approach in increasing attendance during an exercise program (short-term adherence) and continuation of exercise activities for 12 weeks following termination of the formal program (longer term adherence). Participants in both studies were registrants in 10-week exercise groups (jogging, aerobic dance, and pre-ski training) sponsored by the Université de Montréal Sports Centre. The intervention, designed to increase awareness of obstacles to exercise and to develop appropriate techniques for coping with them, was delivered by group leaders within the context of the regular program. Results of both studies indicate a small but consistent superiority of adherence in the experimental condition compared to the control condition. The low cost of this intervention, however, makes even small gains cost effective. Possible methods for strengthening the treatment effect are discussed.     

A Strawsonian look at desert

P.F. Strawson famously argued that reactive attitudes and ordinary moral practices justify moral assessments of blame, praise, and punishment. Here we consider whether Strawson's approach can illuminate the concept of desert. After reviewing standard attempts to analyze this concept and finding them lacking, we suggest that to deserve something is to justifiably receive a moral assessment in light of certain criteria – in particular, eligibility criteria (a subject's properties that make the subject principally eligible for moral assessments) and assignment criteria (particulars about the subject, act, and circumstances that justify assessments such as blame in a particular case). Strawson's analysis of the ordinary attitudes and practices of moral assessment hints at these criteria but does not unequivocally ground a notion of desert. Following Strawson's general naturalistic approach, we show that recent psychological research on folk concepts and practices regarding freedom, moral responsibility, and blame illuminates how people actually arrive at moral assessments, thus revealing the very eligibility criteria and assignment criteria we suggest ground a concept of desert. By pushing the Strawsonian line even further than Strawson did, by empirically investigating actual moral practice and folk understandings, we can illuminate desert and lend credence to Strawson's general anti-metaphysical position.     

ROBUSTNESS AND THE NEW RIDDLE REVIVED

The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's ‘New Riddle of Induction’, Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails to rule out the possibility of equally justified contradictory inductions. More importantly, in illuminating where Jackson's argument fails, the paper casts a new light on the problem of induction, locating the problem not in the nature of the next (unexamined) x, but in the counterfactual robustness of properties of already examined x's.     

Failure to alter psychophysiological reactivity in type a men with physical exercise or stress management programs

Abstract

Psychophysiological reactivity has been associated with heightened risk of coronary heart disease. Since behavioral processes may contribute to disease etiology, the possibility arises that they might also contribute to disease prevention. The capability of behavioral interventions to modify exaggerated reactivity in Type A men. was therefore, brought under experimental scrutiny. Subjects were 107 male managers. who met the following criteria: (1) no history or current signs of heart disease. (2) presence of Type A behavior pattern, and (3) exaggerated psychophysiological reactivity to mental stress. After matching for age and physical fitness level. participants were randomly assigned to one of three 10-week intervention programs: aerohic training, weight training and cognitive-behavioral stress management. Heart rate and blood pressure were monitored while challenging mental tasks were performed in pre-training and post-training laboratory sessions before and after the intervention programs. Although participants in the two physical activity programs showed the expected physical adaptations, no changes in psychophysiological reactivity were seen in the three groups. This negative result may indicate either that reactivity was not altered owing to the conditions of the present experiment, or that these behavioral interventions are truly without effect.     

The Montreal Type A Intervention Project: major findings

This article reports a comparison of three short-term treatments (aerobic exercise, cognitive-behavioral stress management, and weight training) in modifying behavioral and cardiovascular reactivity to laboratory psychosocial stressors in healthy Type A men. One hundred seven men completed the treatments and evaluations, 33 in the aerobic exercise group, and 37 each in the cognitive-behavioral stress management and weight-training groups. The stress management group showed significantly greater changes in behavioral reactivity (reductions of 13% to 23% below initial values) than the two physical exercise groups, which did not differ significantly from each other. For physiological reactivity, changes attributable to intervention were trivial for all three treatment groups. The positive finding of reduced behavioral reactivity as a result of the stress management intervention is of potential clinical significance and warrants further exploration. The lack of meaningful reductions in physiological reactivity also requires further exploration in that it raises questions concerning the ability of behavioral treatments in general to modify physiological reactivity, the ability of existing measures to assess accurately changes that are produced and, most fundamental of all, the relevance of physiological reactivity as an outcome measure for treatment efforts with Type As.