Assessing potential reinforcement-like effects of brief stimuli unrelated to food reinforcers

It is widely assumed that reinforcers are biologically relevant stimuli, or stimuli that have been associated with biologically relevant stimuli. However, brief, arbitrary stimuli have also been reported to have reinforcement-like effects, despite being unrelated to biologically relevant stimuli like food. The present study explored the potential reinforcement-like effects of brief stimuli across 5 experiments. In Experiments 1 through 4, pigeon subjects responded for food reinforcement and brief stimulus presentations in a 2-component multiple schedule. Neither baseline response rates nor resistance to change during disruption tests were systematically greater in a component with versus without brief stimulus presentations. Increasing the rate and duration of brief stimulus presentations in Experiment 4 did not reveal reinforcement-like effects when compared directly with food. In Experiment 5, pigeons chose between independent terminal links in a concurrent-chains procedure. Across conditions, varying the location, duration, and rate of brief stimulus presentations in the terminal links had no systematic effects on preference. In contrast, varying rates of food reinforcers resulted in large and reliable shifts in preference. Therefore, the present study found no systematic evidence that brief stimuli unrelated to food reliably increase response rates, resistance to change, or preference. These data demonstrate the value of systematic replication, and a behavioral momentum approach to assessing potential reinforcement-like effects.     

Maintenance of Relationship and Individual Functioning Gains Following Online Relationship Programs for Low‐Income Couples

Initial evidence suggests that gains in relationship functioning from brief, web‐based programs are maintained through one year following the intervention; however, whether these results generalize to a low‐income sample is unclear. Furthermore, previous research from in‐person couple therapy suggests there may be different shapes of maintenance slopes for behavioral versus acceptance‐based techniques. This study contacted 668 individuals who enrolled in online behavioral (ePREP) or acceptance‐based (OurRelationship) programs one year following completion of the program. Multilevel modeling was used to examine linear and quadratic rates of change in the year following the online intervention as well as total amount of change from pretreatment to 12‐month follow‐up for both relationship and individual functioning. The majority of couples who responded continued to be in a relationship with the same partner (68.3%). Examinations of relationship functioning indicated couples in both programs maintained their gains over follow‐up (i.e., no significant linear or quadratic changes), with medium‐to‐large within‐group effect sizes from pre‐ to one‐year follow‐up. There were no significant differences in relationship outcomes between OurRelationship and ePREP. Similarly, examinations of individual functioning outcomes indicated couples maintained their gains over follow‐up or continued to improve. In total, couples experienced small‐to‐medium within‐group effect sizes from pretreatment to one‐year follow‐up, with larger effects for individuals who were initially distressed. These results suggest that online programs create lasting change for low‐income couples in relationship and individual functioning, with minimal differences between behavioral and acceptance‐based orientations.     

In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity

According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism—arguments based on naturalism and motivation—lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view—the Argument from Coincidence—is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one’s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. Responses are considered and shown to be inadequate.     

Charged experiences of natural environments

Natural environments often generate experiences that combine great emotional and moral power—“charged” experiences. Their characteristics are explored through writings that capture them convincingly. They appear to have a perceptual character. Perception of the scene is invested with a sense of something beyond it, and much bigger. It may be God, or immensity in time or space, or the essence of a nation. This encounter is often connected with moral authority. A recurring theme is the sense that environment and the things in it—including the observer—are a self-similar pattern. People are not passive recipients of these experiences. They seek them out. Evoking the environment in words can often evoke the charged experience too—at least in part. The material suggests tasks for psychologists—most simply, finding systematic ways to describe these experiences. That may help other environmental disciplines, which face difficulty characterising the dimension of response. Theoretically, the material raises questions about the representations generated by perceptual processes. The observation that powerful moral imperatives seem to be given in the act of perceiving is also suggestive for the psychology of morality. Culture certainly plays a part in charged responses, but landscapes have the power to be invested with an emotional and moral charge where other stimuli may not. I am indebted to Helen Ross for provoking this article; to Bert Hodges, Eamonn Hughes, David Hale and most particularly to Edna Longley for ideas and examples; and to Noel Sheehy for encouragement. They cannot be blamed for my misunderstandings.     

Rotating trapezia which appear luminous and transparent during reversals

If a rotating trapezium is lit by a visible source at one side, it sometimes reflects light to the observer and sometimes appears dark. This provides information about its orientation which is relevant to the suppression of apparent reversals. Marked suppression does occur if the light is between the observer and the object, but in other cases novel phenomena arise. The onset of light may precipitate corrections, ie discontinuous shifts from an illusory percept to a veridical one. At certain stages the object may also appear to be transparent and luminous, particularly if a bar has been passed through it: the bar then appears to be visible through the object. The effects illustrate the limited use vision makes of seemingly excellent sources of information, but they also indicate that the problem may lie in misplaced sophistication rather than crudity.     

Measurement and modelling of perceived slant in surfaces represented by freely viewed line drawings

Simple pictures under everyday viewing conditions evoke impressions of surfaces oriented in depth. These impressions have been studied by measuring the slants of perceived surfaces, with probes (rotating arrowheads) designed to respect the distinctive character of depicted scenes. Converging arguments indicated that the perceived orientation of the probes was near theoretical values. A series of experiments showed that subjects formed well-defined impressions of depicted surface orientation. The literature suggests that perceived objects might be 'flattened', but that was not the general rule. Instead, both mean slant and uncertainty fitted models in which slant estimates are derived in a relatively straightforward way from local relations in the picture. Simplifying pictures tended to make orientation estimates less certain, particularly away from the natural anchor points (vertical and horizontal). The shape of the object affected all aspects of the observed-object/percept relationship. Individual differences were large, and suggest that different individuals used different relationships as a basis for their estimates. Overall, data suggest that everyday picture perception is strongly selective and weakly integrative. In particular, depicted slant is estimated by finding a picture feature which will be strongly related to it if the object contains a particular regularity, not by additive integration of evidence from multiple directly and indirectly relevant sources.     

Control by reinforcers across time and space: A review of recent choice research

Reinforcers affect behavior. A fundamental assumption has been that reinforcers strengthen the behavior they follow, and that this strengthening may be context‐specific (stimulus control). Less frequently discussed, but just as evident, is the observation that reinforcers have discriminative properties that also guide behavior. We review findings from recent research that approaches choice using nontraditional procedures, with a particular focus on how choice is affected by reinforcers, by time since reinforcers, and by recent sequences of reinforcers. We also discuss how conclusions about these results are impacted by the choice of measurement level and display. Clearly, reinforcers as traditionally considered are conditionally phylogenetically important to animals. However, their effects on behavior may be solely discriminative, and contingent reinforcers may not strengthen behavior. Rather, phylogenetically important stimuli constitute a part of a correlated compound stimulus context consisting of stimuli arising from the organism, from behavior, and from physiologically detected environmental stimuli. Thus, the three‐term contingency may be seen, along with organismic state, as a correlation of stimuli. We suggest that organisms may be seen as natural stimulus‐correlation detectors so that behavioral change affects the overall correlation and directs the organism toward currently appetitive goals and away from potential aversive goals. As a general conclusion, both historical and recent choice research supports the idea that stimulus control, not reinforcer control, may be fundamental.     

Revisionist Responses to the Amoralism Objection: A Reply to Julia Markovits

Some subjectivist views of practical reasons entail that some people, in some cases, lack sufficient reasons to act as morality requires of them. This is often thought to form the basis of an objection to these subjectivist views: ‘the amoralism objection’. This objection has been developed at length by Julia Markovits in her recent book Moral Reason. But Markovits—alongside many other proponents of this objection—does not explicitly consider that her objection is premised on a claim that her opponents deny on first-order grounds, often as part of a socially and politically motivated revisionism about the assessment of agents and their actions. As such, the amoralism objection as she presents it misses its dialectical mark. This has interesting consequences for subjectivism—and the methodology behind it—more generally.