Social influence, marriage, and the heart: cardiovascular consequences of interpersonal control in husbands and wives.

Human and experimental animal research suggests that social stress in general--and chronic, effortful attempts to exert social control in particular--may contribute to cardiovascular disease. We examined the effects of exerting social influence or control on cardiovascular responses in married couples. Compared to husbands discussing a problem with their wives, husbands attempting to influence or persuade their wives displayed larger increases in systolic blood pressure (SBP) before and during the discussion. Furthermore, these physiological effects were accompanied by increases in anger and a more hostile and coldly assertive interpersonal style. Although wives who engaged in social influence attempts displayed generally similar behavior, they did not show the elevated SBP response or anger. We discuss the results in terms of the social context of cardiovascular reactivity and potential marital factors in cardiovascular health.     

The Structure of Creativity in Primary Education: An Empirical Confirmation of the Amusement Park Theory

In this study, we explored the structure of pupils’ creativity in primary education following the Amusement Park Theory, by investigating undiscovered linkages between the domains of writing, mathematics, and drawing. More specifically, we examined: (a) whether some domains and general thematic areas are more closely related to each other than to others, (b) whether literacy and mathematical ability are specific underlying traits of creativity in writing and mathematics, respectively, and (c) whether intelligence and divergent thinking are related to creativity in all domains. The sample consisted of 331 Dutch 4th grade pupils. For each research question, a model was analyzed using structural equation modeling. We found creativity in mathematics and creativity in writing to be most similar, followed by creativity in mathematics and creativity in drawing, with creativity in writing and creativity in drawing being least similar. Additionally, we found evidence for several underlying traits (i.e., literacy ability and mathematical ability) and initial requirements of creativity (i.e., intelligence and divergent thinking), none of which were important for creativity in only one domain, and of which only intelligence was important for creativity in all domains. Herewith, our study provides insights regarding the complexity of the structure of creativity in primary education.     

When the happy victimizer says sorry: Children's understanding of apology and emotion

Previous research suggests that children gradually understand the mitigating effects of apology on damage to a transgressor's reputation. However, little is known about young children's insights into the central emotional implications of apology. In two studies, children ages 4–9 heard stories about moral transgressions in which the wrongdoers either did or did not apologize. In Study 1, children in the no‐apology condition showed the classic pattern of ‘happy victimizer’ attributions by expecting the wrongdoer to feel good about gains won via transgression. By contrast, in the apology condition, children attributed negative feelings to the transgressor and improved feelings to the victim. In Study 2, these effects were found even when the explicit emotion marker ‘sorry’ was removed from the apology exchange. Thus, young children understand some important emotional functions of apology.     

Attitudes,Tracing, and Control

There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections.