Prediction accuracy of text recall: Ease, effort and familiarity

Prediction accuracy of text recall was studied in two experiments. Text characteristics (i.e., consistency and distinctiveness) were manipulated in Experiment 1, and familiarity with the reading-task in Experiment 2. The results were also analyzed and discussed in terms of easy processing (Experiment 1), and in terms of increased and more active processing (Experiment 2). Text characteristics did not affect prediction accuracy. However, being familiar with the reading-task led to good and long-lasting prediction accuracy. Thus, subjects reading a school-book text, instructed to learn the contents of it demonstrated reliable memory awareness, both for immediate recall and for delay of one week. It was also suggested that increased processing demands and active reading enhances prediction accuracy.     

Stroop interference is a composite phenomenon: Evidence from distinct developmental trajectories of its components

Only one previous developmental study of Stroop task performance (Schiller, 1966) has controlled for differences in processing speed that exist both within and between age groups. Therefore, the question of whether the early developmental change in the magnitude of Stroop interference actually persists after controlling for processing speed needs further investigation; work that is further motivated by the possibility that any remaining differences would be caused by process(es) other than processing speed. Analysis of data from two experiments revealed that, even after controlling for processing speed using z‐transformed reaction times, early developmental change persists such that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference is larger in 3rd‐ and 5th graders as compared to 1st graders. This pattern indicates that the magnitude of overall Stroop interference peaks after 2 or 3 years of reading practice (Schadler & Thissen, 1981). Furthermore, this peak is shown to be due to distinct components of Stroop interference (resulting from specific conflicts) progressively falling into place. Experiment 2 revealed that the change in the magnitude of Stroop interference specifically results from joint contributions of task, semantic and response conflicts in 3rd‐ and 5th graders as compared to a sole contribution of task conflict in 1st graders. The specific developmental trajectories of different conflicts presented in the present work provide unique evidence for multiple loci of Stroop interference in the processing stream (respectively task, semantic and response conflict) as opposed to a single (i.e. response) locus predicted by historically – favored response competition accounts.     

The Laboratory-Clinician Team: A Professional Call to Action to Improve Communication and Collaboration for Optimal Patient Care in Chromosomal Microarray Testing

The International Standards for Cytogenomic Arrays (ISCA) Consortium is a worldwide collaborative effort dedicated to optimizing patient care by improving the quality of chromosomal microarray testing. The primary effort of the ISCA Consortium has been the development of a database of copy number variants (CNVs) identified during the course of clinical microarray testing. This database is a powerful resource for clinicians, laboratories, and researchers, and can be utilized for a variety of applications, such as facilitating standardized interpretations of certain CNVs across laboratories or providing phenotypic information for counseling purposes when published data is sparse. A recognized limitation to the clinical utility of this database, however, is the quality of clinical information available for each patient. Clinical genetic counselors are uniquely suited to facilitate the communication of this information to the laboratory by virtue of their existing clinical responsibilities, case management skills, and appreciation of the evolving nature of scientific knowledge. We intend to highlight the critical role that genetic counselors play in ensuring optimal patient care through contributing to the clinical utility of the ISCA Consortium's database, as well as the quality of individual patient microarray reports provided by contributing laboratories. Current tools, paper and electronic forms, created to maximize this collaboration are shared. In addition to making a professional commitment to providing complete clinical information, genetic counselors are invited to become ISCA members and to become involved in the discussions and initiatives within the Consortium.     

Executive control and the experience of regret

The experience of regret rests on a counterfactual analysis of events. Previous research indicates that regret emerges at around 6 years of age, marginally later than the age at which children begin to answer counterfactual questions correctly. We hypothesized that the late emergence of regret relative to early counterfactual thinking is a result of the executive demands of simultaneously holding in mind and comparing dual representations of reality (counterfactual and actual). To test this hypothesis, we administered two regret tasks along with four tests of executive function (two working memory tasks, a switch task, and an inhibition task) to a sample of 104 4- to 7-year-olds. Results indicated that switching, but not working memory or inhibition, was a significant predictor of whether or not children experienced regret. This finding corroborates and extends previous research showing that the development of counterfactual thinking in children is related to their developing executive competence.     

How do alternative ways of responding influence 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance on tests of executive function and theory of mind?

A total of 69 preschool children were tested on measures of false belief understanding (the Unexpected Transfer task), inhibitory control (the Grass/Snow task), and strategic reasoning (the Windows task). For each task, children indicated their response either by pointing with their index finger or by using a nonstandard response mode (pointing with a rotating arrow). The means of responding had no effect on children's performance on the Grass/Snow task or on the Unexpected Transfer task, although children performed better on the Unexpected Transfer task when the key object in the story was removed. In contrast, performance on the Windows task was significantly better when children pointed with the rotating arrow. A follow-up experiment with 79 preschoolers found that this improved performance on the Windows task was sustained even after the nonstandard response mode was removed and children again pointed with their finger. These findings together suggest that nonstandard response modes do not help children to inhibit prepotent pointing responses but may help them to formulate response strategies on reasoning tasks by discouraging unreflective impulsive responding.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

Is belief reasoning automatic?

Understanding the operating characteristics of theory of mind is essential for understanding how beliefs, desires, and other mental states are inferred, and for understanding the role such inferences could play in other cognitive processes. We present the first investigation of the automaticity of belief reasoning. In an incidental false-belief task, adult subjects responded more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's belief about an object's location than to questions concerning the object's real location. Results in other conditions showed that responses to belief questions were not necessarily slower than responses to reality questions, as subjects showed no difference in response times to belief and reality questions when they were instructed to track the person's beliefs about the object's location. The results suggest that adults do not ascribe beliefs to agents automatically.