排序方式: 共有43条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》1997,47(3):351-377
I start by using “Frankfurt-type” examples to cast preliminary doubt on the “Objective View” - that one is blameworthy for
an action only if that action is objectively wrong, and follow by providing further arguments against this view. Then I sketch
a replacement for the Objective View whose core is that one is to blame for performing an action, A, only if one has the belief
that it is morally wrong for one to do A, and this belief plays an appropriate role in the etiology of one's A-ing. I next
defend this core against recently advanced objections and then show how it helps with defusing a skeptical challenge from
the direction of causal determinism against blameworthiness. Finally, I exploit the core to isolate an analogous epistemic
core for nonmoral but “normative” varieties of blameworthiness.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
3.
Discussion regarding education??s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education??s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ??overriding?? to be explained. The second associates education??s ultimate aims with the intrinsic value of personal well-being. We advance reasons to doubt that these strategies are successful. The shortcomings of these strategies impute yet further urgency to the issue of how we are to ascertain and validate education??s ultimate aims. 相似文献
4.
Gina P. Owens Ph.D. Boris Dashevsky Kathleen M. Chard Somaia Mohamed Uzair Haji Pia Santiago Heppner 《Military psychology》2013,25(1):114-125
The current study investigated the effects of combat exposure, childhood trauma, and depression on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) severity. Participants were 299 male veterans from the Korean War, World War II, Vietnam, and the first Gulf War who were being screened for admission to the PTSD unit. Participants were assessed with the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS), Combat Exposure Scale (CES), Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAMD), Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ), and Mississippi Scale for PTSD (MPTSD). Results of multiple regression analyses indicated that, as expected, combat exposure and depression were significant predictors of PTSD severity. When examined with combat exposure, childhood trauma has a complex relationship to PTSD severity. Examination of the interaction between the CES and CTQ suggests that when levels of combat are low and childhood trauma levels are high, the CTQ is related to higher levels of PTSD severity on the CAPS, regardless of depression. Treatment implications are discussed. 相似文献
5.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):179-201
Famed so-called ‘Frankfurt-type examples’ have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the ‘dilemma objection’ is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to one or the other horns of the dilemma. 相似文献
6.
7.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《The Journal of Ethics》2000,4(3):211-235
I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane's libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane's recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane's theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in which the past and the laws are held constantuntil the moment of choice does B instead, thereis no explanation (deterministic or indeterministic)of the difference in outcome – Jones's A-ing butJones*'s B-ing – in terms of prior reasonsor motives of either agent. Absence of such anexplanation is one crucial factor that underliesthe charge that Jones's A-ing and Jones*'sB-ing are matters of luck. I argue that thissort of luck is incompatible with responsibility. 相似文献
8.
Synthese - The set with the following members is inconsistent: F-Lesson: A person can be blameworthy for performing an action even though she cannot refrain from performing it. Equivalence:... 相似文献
9.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《The Journal of Ethics》2017,21(1):37-61
I motivate a dilemma to show that nothing can be obligatory for anyone regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism (the falsity of determinism) is true. The deterministic horn, to which prime attention is directed, exploits the thesis that obligation requires freedom to do otherwise. Since determinism precludes such freedom, it precludes obligation too. The indeterministic horn allows for freedom to do otherwise but assumes the burden of addressing whether indeterministically caused choices or actions are too much of a matter of luck to be obligatory for anyone. I critically discuss a response to the deterministic horn that invokes the distinction between alternatives compatible with determinism (weak alternatives) and those incompatible with determinism (strong alternatives). 相似文献
10.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |