Implicit and explicit learning: individual differences and IQ

We explored the degree to which individual differences in performance were observed in a group of subjects who worked with two different tasks: one implicit and one explicit. The implicit task was a standard artificial grammar-learning task; the explicit was a series-completion problem-solving task. Substantial individual differences were found between subjects on the explicit task; relatively small individual differences were found on the implicit task. Moreover, performance on the explicit task correlated strongly with intelligence quotient, but performance on the implicit task did not. Data from previous experiments were also found to be in agreement with these results. The findings are presented in the context of a general theory of implicit learning proposed recently by Reber (1989a, in press) that derives from considerations of the evolution of cognitive processes. This evolutionary model argues that unconscious, implicit induction systems are evolutionarily older and antedate conscious, explicit learning processes, and that this antiquity carries with it particular patterns of function that differentiate implicit processes from explicit processes.     

Attempting to model dissociations of memory

Kinder and Shanks report simulations aimed at describing a single-system model of the dissociation between declarative and non-declarative memory. This model attempts to capture both Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) and recognition memory with a single underlying representation. However, the model fails to reflect an essential feature of recognition memory - that it occurs after a single exposure - and the simulations may instead describe a potentially interesting property of over-training non-declarative memory.     

The use of heuristics in intuitive mathematical judgment

Anecdotal evidence points to the use of beauty as an indication of truth in mathematical problem solving. In the two experiments of the present study, we examined the use of heuristics and tested the assumption that participants use symmetry as a cue for correctness in an arithmetic verification task. We manipulated the symmetry of sets of dot pattern addition equations. Speeded decisions about the correctness of these equations led to higher endorsements for both correct and incorrect equations when the addend and sum dot patterns were symmetrical. Therefore, this effect is not due to the fact that symmetry facilitates calculation or estimation. We found systematic evidence for the use of heuristics in solving mathematical tasks, and we discuss how these findings relate to a processing-fluency account of intuition in mathematical judgment.     

More thoughts on the unconscious: reply to Brody and to Lewicki and Hill

Brody (1989) and Lewicki and Hill (1989) present commentaries on my central thesis (Reber, 1989) that there exist powerful induction routines that operate largely independently of awareness and yield rich and complex tacit knowledge that resists attempts to make it conscious, although these commentaries are of dramatically different kinds. Because there is a fairly clear basis of agreement between Lewicki and Hill and the points that I made, this reply deals almost entirely with the issues raised by Brody. The focus is on two classes of issues: (a) those of a methodological nature that surround the general problem of doing experiments on unconscious cognition and (b) those that derive from considerations of evolutionary biology that provide a basis for arguing that implicit operations are primary and form the foundation for conscious processes.     

Very long term memory for tacit knowledge

Very long term memory for abstract materials was examined by recalling subjects who had served in a synthetic grammar learning experiment two years earlier. In that study (Reber & Allen, 1978) we differentiated among several cognitive modes of acquisition, their resultant memorial representations, and their associated decision processes. Two years later and without any opportunity for rehearsal or relearning, subjects still retain knowledge of these grammars to a remarkable degree. Although some differences have become blurred with the passage of time, the form and structure of that knowledge and the manner in which it is put to use remain strikingly similar to the original. That is, differences traceable to acquisition mode and conditions of initial training can still be observed. As in the original study, these results are discussed within the general context of a functionalist approach to complex cognitive processes.     

Formation of semantic associations between subliminally presented face-word pairs

Recent evidence suggests that consciousness of encoding is not necessary for the rapid formation of new semantic associations. We investigated whether unconsciously formed associations are as semantically precise as would be expected for associations formed with consciousness of encoding during episodic memory formation. Pairs of faces and written occupations were presented subliminally for unconscious associative encoding. Five minutes later, the same faces were presented suprathreshold for the cued unconscious retrieval of face-occupation associations. Retrieval instructions required participants to classify the presented individuals according to their putative (1) regularity of income, (2) length of education, and (3) creativity value of occupational activity. The three instructions yielded more classifications consistent with a person’s occupation if the person had been subliminally presented with his written occupation versus a meaningless word (control condition). This suggests that consciousness is not necessary to encode, long-term store, and retrieve semantically precise associations between primarily unrelated items.     

Exploring "fringe" consciousness: the subjective experience of perceptual fluency and its objective bases

Perceptual fluency is the subjective experience of ease with which an incoming stimulus is processed. Although perceptual fluency is assessed by speed of processing, it remains unclear how objective speed is related to subjective experiences of fluency. We present evidence that speed at different stages of the perceptual process contributes to perceptual fluency. In an experiment, figure-ground contrast influenced detection of briefly presented words, but not their identification at longer exposure durations. Conversely, font in which the word was written influenced identification, but not detection. Both contrast and font influenced subjective fluency. These findings suggest that speed of processing at different stages condensed into a unified subjective experience of perceptual fluency.     

Relaxing decision criteria does not improve recognition memory in amnesic patients

An important question about the organization of memory is whether information available in non-declarative memory can contribute to performance on tasks of declarative memory. Dorfman, Kihlstrom, Cork, and Misiaszek (1995) described a circumstance in which the phenomenon of priming might benefit recognition memory performance. They reported that patients receiving electroconvulsive therapy improved their recognition performance when they were encouraged to relax their criteria for endorsing test items as familiar. It was suggested that priming improved recognition by making information available about the familiarity of test items. In three experiments, we sought unsuccessfully to reproduce this phenomenon in amnesic patients. In Experiment 3, we reproduced the methods and procedure used by Dorfman et al. but still found no evidence for improved recognition memory following the manipulation of decision criteria. Although negative findings have their own limitations, our findings suggest that the phenomenon reported by Dorfman et al. does not generalize well. Our results agree with several recent findings that suggest that priming is independent of recognition memory and does not contribute to recognition memory scores.     

Contrasting Cortical Activity Associated with Category Memory and Recognition Memory

We collected functional neuroimaging data while volunteers performed similar categorization and recognition memory tasks. In the categorization task, volunteers first studied a series of 40 dot patterns that were distortions of a nonstudied prototype dot pattern. After a delay, while fMRI data were collected, they categorized 72 novel dot patterns according to whether or not they belonged to the previously studied category. In the recognition task, volunteers first studied five dot patterns eight times each. After a delay, while fMRI data were collected, they judged whether each of 72 dot patterns had been studied earlier. We found strikingly different patterns of brain activity in visual processing areas for the two tasks. During the categorization task, the familiar stimuli were associated with decreased activity in posterior occipital cortex, whereas during the recognition task, the familiar stimuli were associated with increased activity in this area. The findings indicate that these two types of memory have contrasting effects on early visual processing and reinforce the view that declarative and nondeclarative memory operate independently.     

Conceptualizing Religious Practices in Psychological Research: Problems and Prospects

This article addresses the problems and prospects that follow from the conceptualization of religious phenomena and practices for scientific investigation in the psychology of religion. Two Western research traditions—instrumentalism and operationalism—are described and their potential contribution to a mismatch between what researchers intend to study and what they actually study is illustrated through two exemplar studies. The exemplar studies show how researchers’ concern with methodological rigor can compromise the rich and thick meanings of religious practices, resulting in the misrepresentation of the practices and misleading both the psychological and religious research consumer. Several suggestions for dealing with these problems are discussed.