Group beliefs

It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or their representatives — acting in their right positions and tasks, and in a sense creating group commitments for all the members to accept (and keep accepting) the view in question. Also aggregate accounts of group belief are considered in the paper, especially the shared we-belief approach. Such aggregate accounts purport to account for merely factual group beliefs.I wish to thank Kaarlo Miller and Philip Pettit for critical comments.     

The Neural Bases of Drawing. A Meta-analysis and a Systematic Literature Review of Neurofunctional Studies in Healthy Individuals

Neuropsychology Review - Drawing is a multi-component process requiring a wide range of cognitive abilities. Several studies on patients with focal brain lesions and functional neuroimaging studies...     

Changes in research on Judaism in the Hellenistic and early Roman periods

This article offers an overview of what every theologian and scholar of religion should know about changes in biblical studies that have taken place concerning the past depreciation of Second Temple Judaism, the use of newly discovered sources and their implications, as well as integrative approaches to top-down (reflected beliefs, prescribed practices, textual sources) and bottom-up (intuitive beliefs, lived practices, material culture) processes. Changes in the field lead to the re-writing of the history of the Bible and of Judaean society in the Greco-Roman context. By means of this co-authored research article, we wish to demonstrate the benefit of, as well as the need for, interdisciplinary work in the study of antiquity.     

Group Agents and Their Responsibility

Group agents are able to act but are not literally agents. Some group agents, e.g., we-mode groups and corporations, can, however, be regarded as functional group agents that do not have “intrinsic” mental states and phenomenal features comparable to what their individual members on biological and psychological grounds have. But they can have “extrinsic” mental states, states collectively attributed to them—primarily by their members. In this paper, we discuss the responsibility of such group agents. We defend the view that if the group members have accepted the group agent’s (attributed) attitudes and are committed to them, we can favorably compare the situation with the case of individual human agents and a group agent can be regarded as morally responsible for its intentional activities.     

Notes on the weighting biases in value trees

The variation in the structure of value trees can have undesirable effects on the attribute weights. Earlier experiments suggest that an attribute receives a higher weight if it is presented at an upper level in a value tree or if it is split into subattributes. Here we show that it is flawed to make conclusions about the biases at the individual level based on the averages of weights across large groups of subjects. Averages do not describe individual behavior. Furthermore, the averages of weights tend to approach even weights. By using the data from earlier experiments we illustrate how the averaging can produce different phenomena. We also show that the use of weights based on the rank order of attributes only can easily lead to biases when the structure of a value tree is changed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Joint action and group action made precise

The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator.