On the ethics of psychological research

Three philosophical positions on the nature of ethics were examined and contrasted within the context of psychological research: (a) teleology, which involves the balancing of the costs and benefits associated with an action as a means of developing general ethical rules; (b) deontology, which involves the rational adherence to rigid, universal rules that hold irrespective of the situation or consequences; and (c) skepticism, which involves denying the ability to apply universal rules and asserting the individuality of moral codes. Two experiments investigated the degree to which judgments of the ethicality of psychological research are affected by the consequences of the research and judge's ethical ideology. Subjects judged experiments that investigated obedience to an authority as generally less moral and more threatening to the participants' dignity and welfare when the proportion of total obedience was high rather than low. The proportion of participants (10 vs 40%) who were described as “psychologically upset” by the research did not affect moral judgments. These results were obtained across two different obedience situations (Milgram's study and a Watergate study) and different subject populations (high school and college students, males and females). As suggested by philosophers, a judge's ethical ideology determined how the perceived benefits and costs of the research were correlated with moral judgments. Teleologists weighed scientific benefits heavily, deontologists weighed participants' costs heavily, and skeptics weighed both heavily.     

A meta-analytic review of the Dark Triad–intelligence connection

We conducted a meta-analytic review of the relations between general mental ability (GMA) and the Dark Triad (DT) personality traits—Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy—to determine if individuals who display socially exploitative social qualities tend to be more intelligent or less intelligent. Across 48 independent samples, GMA showed no consistent relation with any DT trait. These effects were not sufficient to support either the “evil genius” hypothesis (highly intelligent individuals tend to display socially exploitative personality traits) or the “compensatory” hypothesis (less intelligent individuals compensate for their cognitive disadvantages by adopting manipulative behavioral tendencies). However, these relations were moderated, to some extent, by the sex and age of the participants, type of sample studied, and the measure of GMA.     

Comparing measures of cognitive bias relating to eating behaviour

Consumption of and/or abstinence from substances with a high reward value (e.g. heroin, marijuana, alcohol, nicotine, certain foods) are associated with cognitive biases for information related to the substance. Such cognitive biases are important since they may contribute to difficulties in controlling intake of the substance. We examine cognitive biases for stimuli related to food. For the first time, we concurrently employ and compare five conceptually distinct measures of cognitive bias (dot probe, emotional Stroop, recognition, EAST, explicit attitudes). Contrary to expectations from current theory, the relation between the cognitive measures was weak and evident only in certain subsets of the population sample, as defined by gender and emotional‐, restrained‐ and external‐eating characteristics of our participants. We discuss some methodological implications of our findings. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interpersonal determinants of attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior

In a test of predictions derived from an identity-analytic model of self-presentational behavior, individuals who privately endorsed positive or negative attitudes about sexual behavior were asked to deliver a prosexuality speech while alone, while watched by observers, or while being watched by observers who questioned the morality of the subject’s actions. Subsequent attitude measures indicated that the subjects who initially adopted negative attitudes justified their behavior by expressing more favorable attitudes about sexuality, but only when no audience witnessed their speech. When an audience was present, these individuals emphasized their lack of choice. In contrast, subjects who privately endorsed positive attitudes publicly expressed less favorable attitudes when their morality was challenged by the observers. These findings suggest that attitude change following counterattitudinal behavior (a) stems from private image-maintenance needs as well as public self-presentational concerns, and (b) is sometimes designed to secure an image of morality as well as an image of consistency.     

Inferences about actions performed in constraining contexts: Correspondence bias or correspondent inference?

Prior studies of the correspondence bias reveal a tendency for people to base inferences on behaviors they observe, even when these behaviors are highly constrained by the social context in which they occur. Three processes may combine to sustain this effect: (a) an insufficient adjustment of initial estimates caused by the fundamental attribution error (FAE); (b) the reliance on intuitive estimates of the prevalence of traits, attitudes, and other dispositional characteristics in the general population; and (c) the assumption that few situations are so coercive that they negate all freedom of choice. These processes were differentiated in a modification of the Jones-Harris paradigm. Participants estimated a particular attitude's prevalence in the general population before reading an essay written under either high or low choice conditions and taking a probable or improbable position. Inferences were consistent with prior probabilities when the essay expressed a highly probable opinion and consistent with behavior when the essay expressed an unlikely opinion. These results suggest that perceivers make inferences by estimating the probability that the observed behavior reflects a dispositional characteristic and then revising their prior estimates of the probability of that characteristic accordingly. Thanks are extended to William R. Pope for his assistance in all phases of this research, and to Karl Kelley, Joel Cohen, Catherine Lewis, Chris Wetzel, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Honorable intentions versus praiseworthy accomplishments: The impact of motives and outcomes on the moral self

A centuries-old philosophical issue—Do honorable intentions make an action praiseworthy or is the best action one that generates the greatest good for the greatest number?—was examined by telling subjects who were working to earn money for themselves or a charity that they succeeded or failed at the task. Confirming predictions derived from personal moral philosophy theory, idealistic individuals who stress the importance of fundamental moral principles (absolutists) felt the most positive about their own morality when they were working for a charity, irrespective of the consequences of their actions. Principled individuals who were not idealistic (exceptionists), however, reported feeling distressed when laboring for a charity rather than themselves and the most morally virtuous when they performed badly when working for personal gain. Relativistic subjects (situationists and subjectivists) did not rate themselves as positively when working for a charity. These findings indicate that, at the psychological level, individuals consider both intentions and consequences when evaluating their own moral successes and failures, but they differ in the weight that they assign to these two factors. This research was supported by the Grants-In-Aid Program for Faculty of Virginia Commonwealth University.     

Honorable intentions versus praiseworthy accomplishments: The impact of motives and outcomes on the moral self

A centuries-old philosophical issue—Do honorable intentions make an action praiseworthy or is the best action one that generates the greatest good for the greatest number?—was examined by telling subjects who were working to earn money for themselves or a charity that they succeeded or failed at the task. Confirming predictions derived from personal moral philosophy theory, idealistic individuals who stress the importance of fundamental moral principles (absolutists) felt the most positive about their own morality when they were working for a charity, irrespective of the consequences of their actions. Principled individuals who were not idealistic (exceptionists), however, reported feeling distressed when laboring for a charity rather than themselves and the most morally virtuous when they performed badly when working for personal gain. Relativistic subjects (situationists and subjectivists) did not rate themselves as positively when working for a charity. These findings indicate that, at the psychological level, individuals consider both intentions and consequences when evaluating their own moral successes and failures, but they differ in the weight that they assign to these two factors.