Conceptions of truth in intuitionism

Intuitionism's disagreement with classical logic is standardly based on its specific understanding of truth. But different intuitionists have actually explicated the notion of truth in fundamentally different ways. These are considered systematically and separately, and evaluated critically. It is argued that each account faces difficult problems. They all either have implausible consequences or are viciously circular.     

Hilbert's Program Revisited

After sketching the main lines of Hilbert's program, certain well-known andinfluential interpretations of the program are critically evaluated, and analternative interpretation is presented. Finally, some recent developments inlogic related to Hilbert's program are reviewed.     

Ramsification and inductive inference

An argument, different from the Newman objection, against the view that the cognitive content of a theory is exhausted by its Ramsey sentence is reviewed. The crux of the argument is that Ramsification may ruin inductive systematization between theory and observation. The argument also has some implications concerning the issue of underdetermination.     

More on Putnam and Tarski

Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory oftruth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The otherignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.     

The Concept of Truth in a Finite Universe

The prospects and limitations of defining truth in a finite model in the same language whose truth one is considering are thoroughly examined. It is shown that in contradistinction to Tarskirs undefinability theorem for arithmetic, it is in a definite sense possible in this case to define truth in the very language whose truth is in question.