Binocular vision with two stabilized retinal images

Experiments are described in which each eye is presented with a target whose image remains on the same part of the retina when the eye moves. The patterns presented to each eye may be similar and may be placed on corresponding parts of the retina or may be placed in non-corresponding positions: alternatively, different targets may be presented to the two eyes. Each pattern fades intermittently. Sometimes both are seen together and sometimes both fields are dark at once. There is a small negative correlation between the times of clear vision with the two eyes. When corresponding areas of the two retinas are illuminated with red and green light respectively, the composite colour (yellow) is never perceived with steady illumination. When two similar patterns are in nearly corresponding positions there may be subjective fusion. With two different targets there is sometimes a subjective impression that the two patterns move with respect to one another even though their positions on the retina are fixed.     

Negative priming effects in children engaged in nonspatial tasks: evidence for early development of an intact inhibitory mechanism

Three experiments are reported that examined conceptual negative priming effects in children 5 to 12 years of age. Experiment 1 used a negative priming variant of a flanker task requiring the naming of a central color blob flanked by irrelevant distractors. Experiment 2 used a negative priming variant of the Stroop color-word task. Experiment 3 used a same-different matching task with novel 3-D shapes. Results revealed significant and equivalent magnitudes of negative priming across the tested age groups for all 3 tasks. It is concluded that the inhibitory mechanism underlying conceptual (i.e., identity or semantic) negative priming in visual selective attention tasks is intact in young children. Because the findings and conclusions diverge from the developmental literature on negative priming, the authors attempt to reconcile the contradictions by pinning down the reasons for the discrepancies.     

What predicts adjustment among law students? A longitudinal panel study

Although at the time of this article's publication, many anecdotes and cross-sectional studies had reported that law students experience significant distress during their 1st year, few researchers had controlled for prelaw school status (e.g., M. Garrison, B. Tomko, & I. Yip, 1996; L. Guinier, M. Fine, J. Balin, A. Bartow, & D. L. Stachel, 1994), and only a single group of researchers had explored a psychosocial factor that predicted these changes. The present authors tested 3 sets of potential predictors of adjustment: sources of stress, coping strategies, and relationship factors. The present data replicated declines in students' psychological health, physical health, and attitudes toward law over the 1st year of school. That result supports the generalizability and currency of previous studies. In contrast to other researchers, the present authors found few gender differences. Less relationship happiness, less emotional support, and use of less active coping tactics at the beginning of the year predicted poorer outcomes at the end of the year. Strain from academic pressures, lack of personal time, and social isolation were correlated with poorer outcomes.     

Responsible engineering: the importance of character and imagination

Engineering Ethics literature tends to emphasize wrongdoing, its avoidance, or its prevention. It also tends to focus on identifiable events, especially those that involve unfortunate, sometimes disastrous consequences. This paper shifts attention to the positive in engineering practice; and, as a result, the need for addressing questions of character and imagination becomes apparent.     

Moral Machines?

Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen??s Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2009) explores efforts to develop machines that, not only can be employed for good or bad ends, but which themselves can be held morally accountable for what they do??artificial moral agents (AMAs). This essay is a critical response to Wallach and Allen??s conjectures. Although Wallach and Allen do not suggest that we are close to being able to create full-fledged AMAs, they do talk seriously about making incremental progress in the direction of creating them (even if we never fully succeed). However, there are important questions about the moral development of AMAs that Moral Machines does not address. Given the responsibilities entrusted to human moral agents, we take questions about their moral development very seriously. In the case of children, the hope is that eventually they will develop into full-fledged moral agents. How might we expect this to go with less than fully formed AMAs? Will there be a comparable story of moral development and moral education that we can tell?     

Media Influence on Drive for Thinness and Drive for Muscularity

The present study investigated relationships between media influence (exposure, self-comparison to media ideals and internalization of media messages, societal pressure to have the perfect body, using media as a source of information about how to achieve a certain body ideal) and drive for thinness and drive for muscularity in 311 male and female undergraduates at a university in the Rocky Mountain region of the United States. We hypothesized that drive for thinness and drive for muscularity in both women and men would relate to body comparison/internalization, societal pressure, use of media for information, magazine consumption and television viewing. We also expected television and magazines would have different influences on men and women’s drive for muscularity and drive for thinness. Finally, we hypothesized that societal pressure and using media as a source of information would mediate the relation between media exposure (number of magazines read, hours of television watched) and drive for thinness and drive for muscularity in women and men. Students completed surveys on-line. Results revealed using media as a source of information on how to attain the ideal body mediates the relationship between drive for thinness and media exposure in women. Overall, it seems that media and the internalization of general/non-athletic body ideals may have an impact on drive for thinness in both men and women. Similarly, internalization of athletic body ideals may relate to drive for muscularity in both collegiate men and women in the U.S. Implications for counselors were discussed.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

A Computational Model of the Self‐Teaching Hypothesis Based on the Dual‐Route Cascaded Model of Reading

The self‐teaching hypothesis describes how children progress toward skilled sight‐word reading. It proposes that children do this via phonological recoding with assistance from contextual cues, to identify the target pronunciation for a novel letter string, and in so doing create an opportunity to self‐teach new orthographic knowledge. We present a new computational implementation of self‐teaching within the dual‐route cascaded (DRC) model of reading aloud, and we explore how decoding and contextual cues can work together to enable accurate self‐teaching under a variety of circumstances. The new model (ST‐DRC) uses DRC’s sublexical route and the interactivity between the lexical and sublexical routes to simulate phonological recoding. Known spoken words are activated in response to novel printed words, triggering an opportunity for orthographic learning, which is the basis for skilled sight‐word reading. ST‐DRC also includes new computational mechanisms for simulating how contextual information aids word identification, and it demonstrates how partial decoding and ambiguous context interact to achieve irregular‐word learning. Beyond modeling orthographic learning and self‐teaching, ST‐DRC’s performance suggests new avenues for empirical research on how difficult word classes such as homographs and potentiophones are learned.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.