Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.     

Improvement of arithmetic self concept through combined positive reinforcement, peer interaction, and sequential curriculum

This study investigated the development of arithmetic self concept and achievement among seven- to nine-year-old children who had problems or who were at the bottom of the lowest track of a third grade. Ss were two girls and two boys from a class of 24 low track children, who completed a one-dimensional five-point scale for self concept and were administered 20-item tests for achivement in arithmetic repeatedly throughout eight weeks of instruction. Formation of small groups, peer interaction, individual curriculum adjustment, and positive reinforcement both at individual and group level were applied. Effective, correlated results were recorded along both scales for each child, and the gains for the four target children were shown in comparison to the class as a whole.     

Universal Gravitation and the (Un)Intelligibility of Natural Philosophy

This article centers on Hume's position on the intelligibility of natural philosophy. To that end, the controversy surrounding universal gravitation shall be scrutinized. It is very well known that Hume sides with the Newtonian experimentalist approach rather than with the Leibnizian demand for intelligibility. However, what is not clear is Hume's overall position on the intelligibility of natural philosophy. It shall be argued that Hume declines Leibniz's principle of intelligibility. However, Hume does not eschew intelligibility altogether; his concept of causation itself stipulates mechanical intelligibility.